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Abstract
The 2008 crisis and the ensuing Great Recession shook the consensus on how to run economic policy. They
reminded us that financial imbalances could significantly derail economic activity. In addition, they showed
that existing policy tools did not guarantee macro-financial stability; thereby leading to a rethink of monetary
policy and financial regulation.
Such a reevaluation has prompted a call for macroprudential tools, i.e., those tools intended for limiting
systemic risk and ensuring the resilience of the financial sector. Besides, it has raised new questions about
monetary policy and its effects on the risk taking behavior of economic agents - the so-called risk taking
channel.
A decade from the beginning of the crisis, the contours of a new policy framework for economic and
financial stability are still very unclear. Knowledge on which regulatory instruments and how to employ them
to curb the buildup of imbalances is limited. Neither is much known about the costs of those instruments.
Regulatory intervention constraints some behaviors and distorts the allocation of resources. Consequently,
the risk of imposing insidious costs on economic growth must not be underestimated.
Likewise, very little is known about the relationship between monetary policy and the perception and
pricing of risk by market participants. Nonetheless, it is natural to think that the monetary policy stance may
affect the risk taking behavior of economic units, by influencing the attitudes towards risk and the assessment
of risks. If so, failure by monetary authorities to consider this phenomenon could exacerbate boom bust
patterns.
The aim of this thesis is to explore the path towards macroeconomic and financial stability. I have basedmy
work on the modern dynamic macroeconomic methods and techniques. Specifically, the first essay develops a
canonical real business cycle model to assess the macroeconomic consequences of bank capital requirements,
arguably the most used prudential tool. The second essay zooms in on the banking sector, and proposes a
structural dynamic model with a large number of heterogeneous banks. The model is employed to study the
effectiveness of interbank exposure limits. Having analyzed regulatory intervention, the last essay uses time
series econometrics to shed some light on the risk taking channel of monetary policy.
It is my firm belief that macroeconomics models for financial stability analysis should consider nonlinear
patterns such as state dependence, asymmetries and amplification effects. Under unusual conditions like
financial booms or credit crunches, economic agents behave differently than during normal times. In other
words, the inner workings of the macroeconomy become essentially nonlinear under abnormal circumstances.
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Therefore, local behavior around the long run equilibrium of the economy is unlikely to contain relevant
information about what may happen in exceptional events. In consequence, I study macroeconomic policy
exclusively through the lens of nonlinear frameworks and techniques.
Regarding themain results, this thesis makes a strong case in favor ofmacroprudential regulation. I provide
clear evidence suggesting that regulatory intervention can be a powerful tool to strengthen financial resilience,
reduce economic volatility and smooth business cycles. In addition, this thesis shows that accommodative
monetary policy can produce overconfidence among market participants; thereby increasing risk taking and
contributing to the buildup of imbalances. In other words, it provides empirical evidence for the existence of
a risk taking channel of monetary policy.
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Re´sume´
La crise de 2008 et la recession qui l’a suivie ont modifie´ le consensus quant a` la conduite de la politique
e´conomique (notamment mone´taire). Elles nous ont rappele´ que les de´se´quilibres financiers peuvent affecter
durablement l’activite´ e´conomique. De plus, elles nous ont montre´ que les instruments actuels de la poli-
tique e´conomique ne garantissent pas toujours la stabilite´ financie`re. Ce constat nous invite a` re-conside´rer la
politique mone´taire et la re´gulation financie`re.
Ainsi les politiques macro-prudentielles1 sont au centre du debat sur la politique e´conomique. De plus,
de nouvelles questions emergent a` propos de l’influence de la politique mone´taire sur la prise de risque des
agents e´conomiques. Cette influence est appele´e le canal de la prise de risque de la politique mone´taire.
Dix ans apre`s le de´but de la crise, les contours d’un nouveau cadre re´gulatoire visant a` la stabilite´ du
syste`me e´conomique et financier sont encore tre`s ambigus. La connaissance quant aux instruments utiles et
la manie`re de les mettre en place pour e´viter l’accroissement des de´se´quilibres reste tre`s limite´e. De plus,
les couˆts e´conomique de ces instruments sont encore mal connus. En effet, la re´gulation financie`re con-
traint les comportements du agents e´conomiques. Par conse´quent, le risque d’imposer des couˆts sur l’activite´
e´conomique lie´e a` la regulation ne peut pas eˆtre sous-estime´.
De meˆme, la relation entre la politique mone´taire et le prix du risque financier est tre`s incertaine. Pourtant,
nous pouvons penser que les mesures prises par les banques centrales peuvent affecter les appre´ciations des
risques, et ainsi avoir des conse´quences sur la prise de risque des agents e´conomiques. Si tel est le cas, ne pas
tenir compte de ce phe´nome`ne peut exacerber les cycles d’expansion-re´cession.
L’objectif de cette the`se est d’explorer la stabilite´ macroe´conomique et financie`re. Mon travail est fonde´
sur les me´thodes et techniques de la macroe´conomie dynamiquemoderne. Plus particulie`rement, mon premier
essai pre´sente unmode`le canonique des cycles re´els pour e´tudier les consequences des exigences minimales de
fonds propres dans le secteur bancaire, sans doute l’instrument prudentielle le plus utilise´. Le deuxie`me essai
se concentre sur l’industrie bancaire, et propose unemode`le structurel dynamique avec des agents he´te´roge`nes.
Le mode`le est utilise´ pour e´tudier l’efficacite´ des politiques visant a` limiter l’exposition interbancaire. Ayant
analyse´ la regulation financie`re, le troisie`me essai emploie l’e´conome´trie des se´ries temporelles pour faire la
lumie`re sur le canal de la prise de risque de la politique mone´taire.
Les mode`les macroe´conomiques utilise´s pour analyser la stabilite´ financie`re doivent prendre en con-
1Les politiques macro-prudentielles visent a` e´viter une de´sorganisation de grande ampleur du syste`me financier, ce qui entrain-
erait de se´rieuses conse´quences pour l’e´conomie re´elle.
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side´ration des comportements non line´aires comme la de´pendance du syste`me e´conomique aux conditions
initiales, les asyme´tries ou les effets d’amplification. Dans certaines conditions inhabituelles, comme des
“booms” e´conomiques ou des pe´riodes de resserrement de cre´dit, les comportements des agents e´conomiques
sont diffe´rents de leurs actions dans des situations normales. Autrement dit, le fonctionnement de l’e´conomie
devient essentiellement non line´aire dans des circonstances anormales. Par conse´quent, les dynamiques lo-
cales autour de l’e´quilibre a` long terme ne sont pas informatives de ce qu’il peut arriver dans des conditions
extreˆmes. J’e´tudie donc la politique e´conomique en utilisant me´thodes et techniques non line´aires.
Concernant les principaux re´sultats, cette the`se montre l’utilite´ potentielle des politiques macropruden-
tielles. Plus particulie`rement, elle met en lumie`re le fait que la re´gulation financie`re peut renforcer la re´silience
financie`re, re´duire la volatilite´ macro-financie`re et lisser les fluctuations e´conomiques de fac¸on significative.
De plus, cette the`se de´voile qu’une politique mone´taire expansionniste peut effectivement ge´ne´rer un exce`s de
confiance parmi les agents e´conomiques, et ainsi augmenter la prise de risque et les de´se´quilibres financiers.
En d’autres termes, mes re´sultats confirment empiriquement l’existence du canal de prise de risque de la
politique mone´taire.
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Chapter 1
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Bank
Capital Requirements
Abstract
In the light of the recent crisis, there is now considerable concern about financial cycles and their
implications for business fluctuations. Macroprudential policy has thus become part of the policy paradigm.
In this work, a model of business cycles is developed which analyzes the macroeconomic consequences
of a minimum bank capital standard. Numerical examples suggest that capital regulation can be useful in
strengthening the resilience of the banking sector, and hence reduce macro-financial volatility.
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1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession have prompted a rethink of economic policy and
financial regulation. At the core of this reconsideration is the growing awareness that financial disturbances
can have long lasting adverse consequences on economic activity [Yellen (2013)]. The development of a
policy framework responsible for financial stability is therefore at the forefront of the policy agenda. Says
Bernanke (2012): “Continuing to develop an effective set of macroprudential policy indicators and tools,
while pursuing essential reforms to the financial system, is critical to preserving financial stability and
supporting the U.S. economy”.
This rethinking of financial regulation has recently led to substantial regulatory changes [De Nicolo
et al. (2012)]. The new focus is on macroprudential tools, i.e., those policies intended for limiting systemic
risk and ensuring the resilience of the financial sector as a whole. For instance, the new Basel III Accords
raised minimum bank capital requirements, and introduced new instruments such as a leverage ratio and
liquidity requirements. Alternative policies, such as caps on loan to value ratios and limits on credit growth,
are also being implemented in various jurisdictions [Claessens (2015)].
While the need for macroprudential policies is now widely accepted, very little is known about their
design, calibration and quantitative effects on the real economy [Claessens (2015)]. As noted by Blanchard
et al. (2013), knowledge is still limited and much remains to be studied.
This paper examines the quantitative effects of bank capital requirements on the real economy. My
analysis uses a nonlinear small open economy real business cycle model. I consider bank capital shocks
(i.e. disruptions in the flow of resources between corporate borrowers and banks that take place in the event
of default) and technology shocks. Bank capital shocks capture episodes of financial distress entailing the
depletion of some assets on the balance sheet of the banking industry [Iacoviello (2015); Guerrieri et al.
(2015)]. Technology shocks are a proxy for changes in the demand for loans.
I investigate three fundamental matters. First, the tradeoff between financial stability and the cost of
financial intermediation associated with capital regulation. Second, what factors affect the likelihood of
hitting the capital regulatory constraint. Third, the role of capital regulation in shaping business cycle
fluctuations.
Recent events have made clear that nonlinearities are an essential component of contemporaneous
macroeconomic analysis [see Richter et al. (2014)]. Successfully modeling extreme events, like credit
booms and financial recessions, demands large and persistent deviations from the deterministic steady state.
Furthermore, analyzing bank capital regulation requires to consider precautionary behavior [Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014); Akinci and Queralto´ (2014)], and the fact that, in reality, capital requirements bind
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only occasionally [Peura and Jokivuolle (2004); Jokipii and Milne (2008)]. Linear approximations around
the long run equilibrium badly capture these equilibrium properties. Therefore, a nonlinear analysis is
needed to avoid major biases, misleading advice and painful policy errors [Benes et al. (2014)]. Nonethe-
less, to circumvent technical complications, most quantitative general equilibrium models examining bank
capital requirements rely on local perturbation methods [see e.g. Clerc et al. (2015); Begenau (2015); Men-
dicino et al. (2016)]. Thus, another contribution of this paper is to assess the macroeconomic consequences
of capital regulation through the lens of a nonlinear framework.
Within my theoretical model, there is a key motive for capital regulation that encourages banks to hold
larger equity buffers and discourages the use of external debt. I assume that banks’ funding costs depend
on the cross-sectional average level of bank equity capital. Individual banks, however, do not internalize
this effect when deciding their balance sheet structure, and hence hold a sub-optimal low level of net worth
in equilibrium. To put it differently, individual banks do not consider the fact that if they were to be better
capitalized, they would make the financial sector more resilient; thereby lowering their funding costs and
dampening macro-financial volatility.
My modeling approach captures a wide range of financial frictions. For example, models of default and
incomplete markets [see e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Arellano (2008); Lorenzoni et al. (2008)], bor-
rowing constraints [see e.g. Uribe (2006); Mendoza (2010); Gertler et al. (2012)] or portfolio adjustment
costs [see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)] predict that funding costs react to aggregate debt and debt
related measures. My approach is also consistent with the empirical literature documenting the inverse re-
lationship between country risk premiums and financial resilience [see e.g. Ferrucci (2003); Dailami et al.
(2008); Mody (2009); Petrova et al. (2010); Dell’Erba et al. (2013)]. In addition, it is consistent with stud-
ies showing that country spreads react to macroeconomic fundamentals; thereby exacerbating aggregate
volatility [see e.g. Neumeyer and Perri (2005); Uribe and Yue (2006)].
To quantitatively assess the role of capital regulation in driving business cycles, I calibrate my model
to Spain’s economy. I choose Spain for two principal reasons. First, banks’ activities, and hence bank-
ing regulation, are at the core of my model. In this regard, Spain is a fitting example, because traditional
banks dominate the Spanish financial system.1 Second, the 2008 crisis and its aftermath triggered a vicious
cycle of soaring loans, failing bank equity, rising funding costs, tightening credit conditions, contracting
output... This left a notable portion of the banking sector under-capitalized, which in turn further hurt
economic performance. Increasing the resilience of the banking sector has thus become a key priority for
1In 2014, traditional banks (i.e. deposit taking institutions) accounted for 69% of total assets of financial institutions excluding
the Spanish Central Bank [FSB (2015)]. This is quite a large value when compared, for instance, with the United States (26%), the
United Kingdom (52%), Germany (59%) or France (62%).
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policy makers [Linde (2016)]. As a result, banks are being forced to strengthen their capital positions. For
instance, Spanish regulators implemented the new international regulatory frameworks Basel II.5 and III
agreements in 2012Q1 and 2013Q1, respectively, notably increasing the strictness of bank capital regula-
tion. Hence, Spain is a good laboratory to perform policy counterfactuals to gauge the effects of capital
requirements.2
The single most remarkable result is that bank capital regulation can be a powerful tool to strengthen the
resilience of the banking sector, and consequently dampen business cycle fluctuations. In all experiments
considered, regulatory intervention increases the banks’ level of net worth and decreases its volatility. As
a result, regulated banks need less external finance and enjoy lower funding costs. This affects the real
economy through the amount and volatility of lending, and therefore of employment and output. As a con-
sequence, capital regulation leads to a considerable stabilization of the economy. A noteworthy feature of
the equilibrium of my model is the power of precautionary behavior. Capital regulation affects banks’ atti-
tudes toward risk. Specifically, it encourages banks to build equity buffers in order to reduce the likelihood
of hitting the minimum capital standard.3 Consequently, the capital requirement constraint is usually either
slack or not too tight. Hence, the potential costs associated with capital regulation are seldommaterialized.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the mechanisms for why bank
capital regulation might matter for economic activity. Section 3 lays out the model and explores key ana-
lytical results. Section 4 presents the solution method, calibration, and numerical results. The final section
concludes.
2 Why Might Bank Capital Regulation Matter?
Few issues in the policy debate are more contentious and elicited a wider range of firmly held views than
the correct level of equity requirements. On the one hand, advocates of stricter regulation highlight the
risks and inefficiencies associated with poorly capitalized institutions, and point to the high costs of the
2008 crisis [Admati et al. (2013)].
Bank capital has several benefits from a financial stability perspective. First, it improves banks’ ability
to absorb losses; thereby reducing the prospects of bank failure episodes [Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)].
Second, bank equity limits excessive risk taking and encourage sounder balance sheet management deci-
2Furthermore, as was mentioned previously my model assumes an inverse relationship between banks’ funding costs and the
health of the financial sector. Appendix A.5 shows that Spain is a nice illustration of such a link.
3In the real world, breaching the minimum equity threshold may be very costly for financial institutions. For instance, it can
result in serious reputational costs, losses of charter value and adverse market reactions [Borio and Zhu (2012)].
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sions. This occurs because thinly capitalized institutions may be tempted to take excessive risks due to
limit liability. In other words, they do not fully internalized asset losses. Equity capital can contain these
excesses by increasing shareholders’ downside exposure [Rochet (1992)]. Thus, equity capital encourages
banks to engage in more monitoring and invest in safer assets [Freixas and Rochet (2008)]. As a result,
strict regulation can (i) protect creditors and taxpayers, (ii) reduce the risks of spillovers from the financial
sector to the real economy, and (iii) foster sustainable economic growth.
On the other hand, opposers of more stringent regulation argue that the latter would notably raise the
cost of financial intermediation, and hence impose insidious costs on economic activity. For instance,
Kashyap et al. (2008) suggest that demanding financial institutions to maintain significantly higher equity
buffers will raise their expected cost of funds; thereby impairing economic performance.
The main concern is the prospect that stricter capital regulation could restrict banks’ ability to extend
credit. This could actually happen whenever equity is significantly more expensive than debt [Borio and
Zhu (2012)]. Therefore, equity requirements, while reducing the likelihood of financial crises, would also
raise banks’ overall funding costs, and hence hinder economic activity.
Although this sort of concern may sound intuitively reasonable, it differs substantially from the domi-
nant paradigm in the academic literature: theModiglianiMiller Theorem. In their seminal paper, Modigliani
and Miller affirmed that a firm value is independent of its capital structure. In the specific case of the bank-
ing sector, this theorem states that the debt-equity mix with which banks are funded affects neither their
overall funding costs nor their lending activities. Consequently, increased capital requirements should not
penalize economic growth.
Nonetheless, further theories provide a rationale for why the Modigliani Miller Theorem may not ap-
ply. Loosely speaking, the basic logic is that the existence of various market frictions breaks down the
neutrality between the composition of banks’ liabilities and credit supply. Frictions that are often referred
to comprehend (i) the “debt overhang” problem [Myers (1977)], (ii) adverse selection in the equity market
[Myers and Majluf (1984)], and (iii) tax shields and government guarantees that subsidize debt financing
[Admati et al. (2013)].
As for the empirical literature, it suggests that higher bank capital is associated with a lower probability
of failure [see e.g. Wheelock and Wilson (2000); Cole and White (2012); Beltratti and Stulz (2012);
Fahlenbrach et al. (2012)]. It has also been well documented that more stringent regulation results in a
more stable and robust credit supply in the long run [see e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991); Kapan and
Minoiu (2013)]. The intuition is straightforward. Equity capital improves banks’ ability to resist both
financial and real disturbances [Diamond and Rajan (2000)].
Another line of research has studied the effects of more stringent capital regulation on credit availability
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[see e.g. Francis and Osborne (2012); Brun et al. (2013); Aiyar et al. (2016)]. Overall, in the short run
increases in equity requirements seem to put a brake on bank lending. A recent review of the literature on
this topic [Martynova (2015)] found that raising the minimum capital standard by 1% is likely to reduce
bank lending by 1.2%-4.5% in the short run.
Capital requirements are being increasingly used, despite the controversy and that little is known about
their usefulness in reducing systemic vulnerabilities [De Nicolo et al. (2012)]. To see this point more
clearly, Figure 1 presents information on the proportion of countries that have implemented the new bank
capital regulation embedded in the Basel II.5 and III Accords.4
The newBasel Accords are designed to tackle the market failures brought to light by the global financial
crisis. They consist of a number of fundamental reforms to the bank capital regulatory framework. The
main objective is to boost the resilience of individual financial institutions by raising both the quantity and
quality of the regulatory capital base. By doing so, the reforms also contain systemic risks that can build
up across the financial industry over time. In other words, the Accords add a macroeconomic dimension
to prudential regulation.
As shown in Figure 1, there has been a very significant tightening of capital requirements since the
global financial crisis, as regulators have implemented the new international regulatory framework. In-
terestingly, instruments linked to capital buffers have been actively used both by advanced and emerging
economies. Therefore, it appears that equity requirements will play a key role in the design of macropru-
dential regulation worldwide in years to come.
3 A Model of Business Cycles with Capital Requirements
I begin this section by describing the structure of themodel and the optimization problems of the economy’s
agents. I then analyze the key optimality conditions in order to provide the essential intuition regarding
capital requirements.
3.1 Setup
Consider a discrete time economy populated by four types of agents: households, international investors,
firms and banks. The representative household consumes, works and holds bank deposits. The represen-
tative firm operates a linear technology that requires labor to produce output. Following Mendoza (2010),
4The sample includes 33 advanced economies and 24 emerging economies. The data has been compiled by Cerutti et al. (2016).
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Figure 1: Implementation of the Basel Accords
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(2016).
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Christiano et al. (2010), and others, input costs must be financed in advance of sales. Hence, the represen-
tative firm demands loans at the beginning of each period and repay them at the end.
In order to meet the demand for loans by local borrowers, a domestic representative bank borrows funds
from both foreign lenders and domestic depositors. Note then the dual nature of the banking activity. The
bank is a borrower vis-a-vis international investors and domestic households, whereas it is a lender when
it comes to its relationship with local firms.
To make matters more interesting and realistic, in the model business fluctuations are partly driven by
exogenous disruptions in the flow of resources between firms and banks. This type of shock is inspired in
Iacoviello (2015) and Guerrieri et al. (2015). The shock can be viewed as losses for the banking industry
stemming, for example, from a wave of non performing loans. More generally, it can simply be considered
as a shock that depletes some assets on the balance sheet of the banking sector. Importantly, the shock
is a pure financial shock, since real resources are not destroyed [Guerrieri et al. (2015)]. Therefore, its
macroeconomic consequences can be interpreted as spillover effects from the financial sector to the real
economy.
As was stated in the Introduction, my model features a pecuniary externality affecting banks’ activities;
which leads them to be undercapitalized. This market failure induces the need of some kind of regulatory
intervention. I consider bank capital requirements; which set a lower bound on the bank capital to assets
ratio.
Households
The representative household chooses sequences of consumption (C), hours worked (H) and bank deposits
(D) in order to maximize its expected lifetime utility5:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1− σ
[
Ct − χ
H1+ωt
1 + ω
]1−σ
, (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor parameter andEt is the conditional expectation operator. Its choices
are constrained by:
Ct +Dt = wtHt + (1 + r
d
t−1)Dt−1 +Qt + Ξt, (2)
where w is the wage rate, Q are wealth transfers between the bank and the household -to be specified
below-, rd is the interest rate of deposits, and Ξ are dividends from local firms.
5I follow Mendoza (2010), Gertler et al. (2012) and others, and define utility as in Greenwood et al. (1988). This functional
form eliminates the wealth effect on labor supply. That is, the latter only depends on the real wage and not on consumption. This
preference specification yields sensible fluctuations in hours worked in the absence of labor market frictions.
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Firms
A representative firm produces the final good (Y ) according to:
Yt = AtHt, (3)
whereHt is the amount of labor services used, and At is a technology shock. The latter evolves according
to a 2-states Markov chain6 with transition matrix Π.
As noted above, the wage bill must be paid in advance of sales. In consequence, each and every period
the firm demands an amount of loans (L) equal to:
Lt = wtHt. (4)
Therefore, the representative firm chooses labor inputs to maximize dividend payments to the household
(Ξ):
Ξt = AtHt − (1 + r
l
t)wtHt + ǫt, (5)
taking as given input prices w as well as the interest rate of loans rl. The term ǫt is a redistribution (or
equivalently, bank capital) shock.7 As noted above, it captures transfers of resources between banks and
firms. Accordingly, the same shock appears in the law of motion for bank equity capital with opposite sign.
I assume that the stochastic process for ǫ follows:
ǫt = δǫt−1 + ut, (6)
where δ ∈ [0, 1) and u ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2u).
Banks
Suppose a competitive environment in which each period a representative bank extends loans (L) to the
representative firm. These loans are financed by combining borrowed funds from foreign investors (F ),
deposits from domestic households (D) and the bank’s own net worth (N ). Thus, the bank’s balance sheet
at period t is8:
Lt = Nt + Ft +Dt. (7)
6Given that the model is solved employing a policy function iteration algorithm, the use of a continuous support for the stochastic
shock is not feasible. I therefore discretize the stochastic variable according to a 2-states Markov chain.
7This modeling device can be found in Iacoviello (2015) and Guerrieri et al. (2015).
8It is important to stress that [L,D, F ] are control variables, whereasN is a state variable. Accordingly,Nt is predetermined at
time t, and hence cannot jump.
16
The bank can also issue new equity (capital inflows) as well as pay dividends (capital outflows). Net external
capital flows (Q) are thus positive whenever the overall amount of dividend payments exceeds the amount
of new equity raised, and vice versa.
In order to restrict the bank’s ability to accumulate enough equity capital to fund all loans internally,
I assume that the bank faces quadratic adjustment costs when the current level of equity differs from its
steady state value (N¯ ). Formally, adjustment costs are represented as:
Γ(Nt) =
τ
2
(
Nt
N¯
− 1
)2
, (8)
where τ ≥ 0. These costs are needed to guarantee stationarity of the state variables.9 The value of τ is
chosen so that these costs are minimal and do not affect the dynamic properties of the model.
Equity capital therefore evolves by:
Nt+1 = Nt + r
l
tLt − r
f
t Ft − r
d
tDt −Qt − Γ(Nt)− ǫt, (9)
where rf is the rate of return on international liabilities. The term ǫ is the bank capital shock, that when
positive, transfers wealth from banks to firms. Hence, operating profits and new issues of equity feed to
the total net worth of the bank, whereas dividend payments represent a leakage.
One point here deserves further comment. As noted above, banks are not usually able to recapitalize
themselves immediately and costlessly. If this were true, capital regulation would be pointless. With this
mind, two layers of imperfections relating to external capital flows are introduced. First, as in Bianchi and
Bigio (2014) and Iacoviello (2015), the bank’s preferences are designed in such a way that a stable path of
net external capital flows is preferred10. Second, Eq.9 implies that when the bank raises new equity at time
t, the collected funds are only available to make new loans at time t+ 1. The bank is therefore prevented
from increasing its equity stock at the very moment of being subject to capital regulation (i.e. just before
undertaking new lending).
Regarding capital adequacy regulation, the bank faces an equity requirement constraint. The latter
ensures that bank capital is at least a fraction κ of loans:
Nt
Lt
≥ κ. (10)
9See Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) for alternative ways of obtaining this.
10This formulation is equivalent to a formulation where the bank pays convex adjustment costs when it sheds or raises external
capital.
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I am now in a position to state the bank’s optimization problem. The bank’s preferences over dividend
streams {Qt}
∞
t=0 are evaluated via and expected utility criterion:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtΛt,t+1log(1 +Qt), (11)
where Λt,t+1 is the household’s stochastic discount factor. As noted by Bianchi and Bigio (2014), intro-
ducing curvature into the objective function is essential. This assumption produces smooth dividends and
slow-moving bank capital, as observed empirically.11 Therefore, the bank’s problem is to choose sequences
{Lt, Ft, Qt}
∞
t=0 to maximize eq.11 subject to Eq.7, Eq.9 and Eq.10.
International Capital Markets
As stated above, the representative bank borrows funds from domestic households and international in-
vestors. More precisely, I assume that a large mass of foreign lenders is willing to lend to the local banking
sector any amount at rate rft . The existence of only one type of bank liability implies that the rate paid to
domestic depositors equals the one paid to foreign lenders. That is, rft = r
d
t ∀t. Furthermore, the small
open economy assumption implies that this rate is determined by the foreign lenders.
A full model of the determination of country risk is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, a
minimal framework of country risk is required in order to perform the quantitative analysis. To make
matters interesting and realistic, I suppose that economic fundamentals drive risk premium. As noted by
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), this notion can be grounded on models of default and incomplete markets [see
e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Arellano (2008); Lorenzoni et al. (2008)] in which the risk of default is
high when economic fundamentals are weak and vice-versa. Also, theoretical frameworks with imperfect
enforcement of contracts, occasionally binding borrowing constraints or portfolio adjustment costs predict
that interest rate premiums increase with the level of total indebtedness [Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2015)].
Likewise, this idea is supported by the empirical literature examining the relationship between country
spreads and various macro-financial indicators, such as debt and debt related variables, the fiscal balance
or GDP growth [see e.g. Ferrucci (2003); Uribe and Yue (2006); Reinhart and Rogoff (2011); Petrova et al.
(2010); Reinhart and Rogoff (2013); Fogli and Perri (2015)].
A related topic that has recently received considerable attention is the link between country spreads
and financial fragility. Generally speaking, financial sector vulnerabilities have been shown to be strongly
associated with higher risk premiums [see, for example, Mody (2009); Petrova et al. (2010)]. The basic
11This kind of preferences are usually found in the corporate finance literature. One way to rationalize these preferences is through
agency frictions that might give rise to capital adjustment costs [Estrella (2004)].
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logic is that financial sector stress projects a deterioration of growth prospects. In turn, theweaker economic
outlook increases default probabilities; thereby exerting further pressure on the financial industry, and
hence increasing risk country premiums. Put it differently, the health of the financial sector, economic
activity and the country risk premium tend to be self-reinforcing forces.
All told, country spreads are broadly viewed as a comprehensive indicator of a country’s overall risk
premium, arising from market, credit, liquidity, and other risks [Petrova et al. (2010)]. Within my model,
a parsimonious way to model this is to assume that the interest rate, rft , is a decreasing function of the
cross-sectional average level of equity capital (Nˆ ) across local banks. This modeling device is essentially
the same as that used by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), Akinci and Queralto´
(2014), among others. Formally, I opt for the logistic function:
rft = ψ0
[
1 + eψ1(Nˆt−N¯)
]
−1
. (12)
Here N¯ , ψ0 and ψ1 are positive parameters. Specifically, N¯ is the threshold around which the dynamics of
rf change. As Nˆt− N¯ approaches minus (plus) infinity, r
f approaches ψ0 (zero). The parameter ψ1 is the
smoothness parameter. As ψ1 increases, the dynamics of r
f change more abruptly depending on whether
Nˆ is greater than or less than N¯ .12
The intuition behind Eq.12 is straightforward. Foreign lenders regard the cross-sectional average level
of equity capital as an indicator of the strength of the domestic banking industry. As a consequence, a
decreasing (increasing) level of average equity causes the premium to increase (decrease) as investors’
perceived risk of investing in the domestic economy increases (decreases).
A point here deserves further comment. The fact that rft depends on the cross-sectional average of eq-
uity gives rise to a pecuniary externality, which banks do not internalize when deciding their balance sheet
structure. Specifically, individual banks do not take into consideration that their own net worth accumula-
tion behavior affects rft . Instead, they take it as exogenously given, and hence out of their control.
13 This
assumption is not innocuous. Note that because all banks are identical, in equilibrium I have that Nˆt must
equalNt. The representative bank, ignoring the implications of its actions on r
f
t , holds a suboptimally low
level of bank equity capital. As a consequence, it is exposed to higher interest rates than a social planner
that internalizes Eq.12. Hence, this externality makes the competitive equilibrium inefficient and induces
the need for regulatory intervention.
Of course, the purpose of Eq.12 is not to provide a satisfactory model of country risk, but only to
capture the idea that a country’s risk premium, economic performance and financial vulnerability tend to
12In the extreme case where ψ1 approaches infinity, Eq.12 converges to the Heaviside function.
13Clerc et al. (2015) have coined the term bank funding costs externality to describe this effect.
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go together. In addition, this reduced form approach predicts that banks’ funding costs are associated with
their risk profiles; which is consistent with conventional wisdom and has been stressed by a number of
others [see e.g. Admati et al. (2013); Arnold et al. (2015)].
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists on sequences of prices
{wt, r
d
t , r
l
t, r
f
t }
∞
t=0
and allocations
{Ct, Ht, Dt, Lt, Ft, Qt, Nt, ǫt}
∞
t=0
that satisfy households’, firms’ and banks’ optimality conditions, the law of motion for net worth, the bank’s
balance sheet identity, labor market clearing, and the following market clearing condition:
Yt = AtHt = Ct. (13)
3.2 The Role of Capital Requirements
Equilibrium Conditions
Let me now look at the distortions introduced by the capital requirement constraint. First, it affects the
bank’s intertemporal decision rules. To see this point more clearly, the Euler equation for net worth is
given by:
ηt = βbEt
[
Λt,t+1
[
ηt+1(1 + r
f
t+1 −
τ
N¯
(
Nt
N¯
− 1
)
+ µt+1
]]
, (14)
where η is the Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion for net worth, which equals the marginal utility
of payouts to the household, and µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital requirement constraint. As
usual, the Euler equation balances the marginal cost of accumulating an extra unit of equity, given by η,
with its marginal benefit. When the constraint is expected to bind next period (i.e. EtΛt,t+1µt+1 > 0) the
marginal benefit of an extra unit of equity is not just given by the present discounted value of the payments
it generates (i.e. EtΛt,t+1ηt+1(1+ r
f
t+1−
τ
N¯
(Nt
N¯
− 1))), but by a larger value. This occurs because, in this
case, this extra unit of equity eases the capital requirement constraint next period. Thus, it carries a shadow
benefit equal to EtΛt,t+1µt+1. Capital regulation therefore encourages precautionary behavior, which in
turn reinforces the resilience of the banking industry.
20
Second, the effects of the constraint on the lending rate can be derived from the bank’s intratemporal
optimality conditions. It can be shown that:
rlt = r
f
t + κ
µt
ηt
. (15)
This is a standard condition equating the marginal product of loans with their marginal cost. During periods
in which the constraint binds (i.e. µt > 0), the bank faces a higher effective marginal financing cost,
capturing a shadow penalty for trying to expand lending when equity requirements are tight.
This result is fairly intuitive. Given that in the model equity is a predetermined variable14, cutting back
on lending is the only available channel of adjustment when the constraint binds. Therefore, the lending
rate must adjust upwards in order to ensure market clearing in the domestic credit market.
A Key Trade-off
The analysis above suggests a trade-off between financial stability and the cost of financial intermediation.
On the one hand, a minimum equity threshold generates a buffer that banks can use in case of distress.
Hence, it reduces the probability of capital shortfalls and the credit crunches associated with them. More-
over, as will become clear, by limiting credit growth in the upturn of the cycle, capital requirements mitigate
the build-up of vulnerabilities in the bank’s portfolio.
On the other hand, the term κ
ηt
µt in Eq.15 explicitly captures the notion that stricter capital regulation
might be passed on to borrowers in the form of higher lending rates, and hence hinder economic activity.
4 The Quantitative Analysis
In the next section, I resort to numerical simulations to (i) investigate the quantitative properties of my
model, as well as to (ii) perform policy counterfactuals in order to analyze the effectiveness of bank capital
regulation.
I solve the model using the policy function iteration algorithm described in Richter et al. (2014); which
is grounded on the work on monotone operators in Coleman (1991). Since this method allows me to solve
the model fully nonlinearly, I can successfully deal with large and persistent deviations from the non-
stochastic equilibrium. Also, I can easily handle the occasionally binding capital requirement constraint.
Furthermore, I can capture precautionary behavior, as the technique fully accounts for shock uncertainty.
14The stickiness of bank equity has recently been documented by Adrian and Shin (2011).
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Calibration
Parameter Symbol Value Source/Target
Non Financial Sector
Discount Factor β 0.995 Int. rate 2% an.
Risk Aversion σ 1.000 Standard RBC value
Inverse Frisch Elast. ω 3.000 Standard RBC value
Labor Disutility χ 26.86 SS labor 30%
Financial Sector
Equity Adjustment Cost τ 4e-05 Stationary equilibrium
Long Run Level Bank Capital N¯ 0.025 SS leverage 7.7%
Exogenous Processes
Technology Persistence ρ 0.956 Solow Residuals
Technology Shock Standard Deviation σA 0.003 Solow Residuals
Persistence Defaults δ 0.737 Net charge-offs
Standard Deviation Default Shock σu 0.001 Net charge-offs
International Capital Markets
Upper bound rf ψ0 0.010 Int. rate 2% an.
Smoothness Parameter ψ1 16,329 SD Int. rate 1.8% an.
4.1 Calibration
The values assigned to the model’s parameters are listed in Table 1. This calibration aims to explain the
Spanish business and financial cycle. To do so, I use quarterly data for the period 1997Q3 to 2011Q4.15
The reason why I only use data until 2011Q4 is because Spanish regulators implemented the Basel II.5
and III agreements in 2012Q1 and 2013Q1, respectively. In other words, capital requirements began to
be significantly higher in 2012Q1. Since my main aim is to perform policy counterfactuals to assess the
impact of more stringent regulation, it is convenient to calibrate the model using data before the tightening
took place. To be consistent, in my baseline calibration, I then set the minimum capital standard, κ, at 0.
Regarding the non-financial sector, there are 3 standard parameters for which I choose conventional
15More details on the data are provided in appendix A.1.
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values. First, I set β = 0.995 so that the household discounts the future at a 2% rate per annum. Second,
the CRRA coefficient is set to σ = 1. Third, the Frisch labor supply elasticity, 1/ω, is set to 0.33, which is
consistent with Chetty et al. (2012). In addition, I set the weight on leisure in the household utility function,
χ, at 26.86, implying a share of active time spent working of one third in the deterministic steady state.
Turning now to the financial sector, the steady state level of bank capital, N¯ , is not uniquely pinned
down by the parameter values, so I set it to match the average of the ratio between capital and total assets
of Spanish Monetary Financial Institutions. During the sample period that value is equal to 7.7%. As for
the equity adjustment cost parameter, τ , I set it to the minimum value that guarantees that the equilibrium
solution is stationary.
Information on the Solow residuals is employed to calibrate the parameters associated with the 2-state
Markov chain governing labor productivity. Specifically, the approach laid out in Tauchen and Hussey
(1991) is used to discretize an AR(1) process with standard deviation and persistent parameters equal to
0.003 and 0.956, respectively. More details on this will be given in Appendix A.2.
To calibrate the parameters associated with the default shock, δ and σu, I use the net charge-offs to
assets ratio of credit institutions.16 More precisely, I estimate an AR(1) process, and let δ be the persistent
parameter of such a regression and σu be the standard deviation of the residuals.
It remains to specify the values for the parameters linked to the international capital market (see Eq.12).
Regardingψ0, in the non-stochastic steady state of themodel, there is a linear mapping between the discount
factor parameter, β, and ψ0. This can be seen immediately from Eq.12 and Eq.14 evaluated at steady state.
Specifically, ψ0 = 2(β
−1 − 1); thereby imposing ψ0 = 0.01.
As forψ1, the calibration strategy is to match a standard deviation of the (annualized) real interest rate
17
of 1.88%. This is a natural target as its theoretical counterpart is directly linked to ψ1. The calibration
procedure employs a grid search method. Specifically, I proceed as follows. First, I construct an equally
space grid for ψ1 on the region [1, 22111] with 2,212 grid points. Second, I define the criterion function
Ω = [SD(rdata)− SD(rmodel)]
2,
where SD(rdata) is the standard deviation of the real interest rate observed in the data and SD(rmodel) its
theoretical counterpart. Third, I solve the model, perform a 500,000 period time simulation and calculate
the standard deviation of rf at each grid point. Lastly, I evaluate the criterion function at each grid point,
16I use the 3-period backwards moving average to smooth fluctuations in the time series.
17The 10-year Spanish government bond is the instrument whose yield is used as the nominal interest rate. The real rate is
obtained by subtracting the GDP deflator inflation from the nominal rate.
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and select the one that yields the smallest value of the criterion. The resulting parameter estimate is ψ1 =
16, 329.18, 19
4.2 Business and Financial Cycle Statistics
This subsection aims to assess the ability of the model to account for Spanish business and financial cycle
facts. I begin by simulating a 500,000 period time series, and then calculate key statistical moments. The
results are reported in Table 2.20 It is important to recall that the only moment used in the calibration
exercise is the standard deviation of the interest rate, rf .
Overall, the business cycle moments of the model are roughly in line with the data. In particular, the
model does a fair job at matching the volatility of the Spanish economy. The model also captures the fact
that interest rates are countercyclical (i.e. negative contemporaneous correlations with output). In addition,
it does well at the dynamic correlations: the equity to assets ratio negatively leads interest rates at different
time-horizons.
There are some discrepancies between the model and the data. For instance, the contemporaneous
cross-correlations between output and the equity to assets ratio in the model is far from the one observed
in the data. Another failure of the model is that the series for the equity to assets ratio and the interest rate
are too persistent with first order autocorrelation coefficients in the neighborhood of 0.97.
As a last exercise to assess the quantitative properties of my theoretical framework, Figure 2 compares
the density of the equity to asset ratio both in the data and in the 500,000 period simulation of the model.
Remarkably, the model replicates reasonably well the observed distribution. For instance, both in the
model and the data the distribution is leptokurtic (kurtosis of 5.6 in the data and of 4.3 in the model). That
is, they have fatter tails than the normal distribution, and thus produce more outliers. Hence, the model
approximates the density satisfactorily, mainly because it is able to capture the asymmetric behavior of the
equity to assets ratio.
I therefore conclude that the quantitative properties of my model seem overall consistent with Spanish
business cycle features.
18Appendix A.6 shows that the optimization problem is well defined; thus corroborating the validity of my methodology.
19Appendix A.7 presents the relationship between interest rates and bank capital once ψ0, ψ1 and N¯ have been calibrated.
20Regarding the data, my measure of Spanish output is the real GDP in logs. To isolate the cyclical component of the series, I use
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. My measure of bank capital to loans ratio is the capital and reserves to assets ratio of Spanish Monetary
Financial Institutions. The real interest rate is measured as the 10-year government bond minus the GDP deflator inflation.
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Table 2: Empirical and Simulated Business Cycle Statistics
Data Model (κ = 0)
Standard Deviation (%)
Yt 1.193 1.341
Nt/Lt 0.676 0.633
rlt 0.473 0.444
Contemporaneous Cross-Correlations
Yt, r
l
t -0.107 -0.106
Yt, Nt/Lt -0.664 -0.082
Dynamic Cross-Correlations
Nt−8/Lt−8, r
l
t -0.611 -0.682
Nt−12/Lt−12, r
l
t -0.817 -0.619
First Order Autocorrelation
Yt 0.928 0.745
Nt/Lt 0.800 0.966
rlt 0.733 0.993
Note: The variables Y , N/L, and rl denote, respectively, output, equity to loans ratio and
the lending rate. The variable Y is HP filtered in logs. The sample contains the period
1997-2011 at quarterly frequency.
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Figure 2: The Unconditional Distribution of Bank Capital to Loans Ratio
Bank Capital to Assets Ratio
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Note: The figure shows the Weibull probability density function of the equity to assets ratio
both in the data and in the model. The density for the model is computed via a 500,000
periods simulation.
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4.3 Macroprudential Policy: Capital Requirements
Let me now consider bank capital requirements that work to offset banks’ incentives to adjust their liability
structure in favor of external debt. This is done by letting the minimum equity threshold, κ, be greater than
0. In what follows κ is set to 9%. That value equals the core capital-ratio target for Spanish banks imposed
by the Spanish Central Bank since 2013.
As discussed in Section 2, there is extensive literature in corporate finance and banking that suggest
that capital requirements involve a tradeoff between financial resilience and economic performance. The
next exercise evaluates whether such a tradeoff is built into the policy functions of the calibrated version of
my model. Specifically, I compare the policy functions of two alternative economies. The first economy
features an active bank capital constraint (i.e. κ = 9%) and is labeled the Regulated Economy. In the
second model economy (my baseline) equity regulation is turned off (i.e. κ = 0%). This economy is
labeled the Unregulated Economy.
Figure 3 depicts the decision rules for bank net worth at t + 1, Nt+1, and output at t, Yt, along the
bank capital axis when At = A2 and ǫt = 0. The bank capital interval is centered on 0.0305 with a width
of ±13.5%, [0.026, 0.035]. In order to isolate the effects of regulation, Figure 3 plots the policy functions
of the Regulated Economy in % deviations (output) and % differences (net worth) from the Unregulated
Economy. The shaded areas represent the states of the economy where the constraint binds in the Regulated
Economy.
Remarkably the model captures the notion that capital requirements have clear benefits from a financial
stability perspective, but may also hinder economic activity. To better understand this result, I begin by
examining the region of the state space where the constraint binds. On the one hand, capital regulation
strongly promotes the accumulation of equity. The top panel shows a significant difference in the bank’s
capital accumulation behavior in both economies. Specifically, the representative banks in the Regulated
Economy consistently accumulates more equity capital than its counterpart in the Unregulated Economy.
Moreover, this gap monotonically increases with the tightness of the constraint. It is in this sense that a
minimum equity threshold acts as a buffer against losses; thus boosting financial stability.
On the other hand, capital regulation restricts the supply of credit, increases lending rates, and hence
lowers output. For instance, the bottom panel reveals that when current bank capital is 0.027, output in the
Regulated Economy is roughly 3% lower than in the Unregulated Economy. This difference is monotoni-
cally reduced as current bank capital increases (i.e. as the tightness of the constraint decreases).
The last areas to consider are the states where the constraint does not bind. In those states, the policy
functions for output are identical. This implies that capital regulation does not impose an insidious cost on
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Figure 3: Policy Functions
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(b) Output Time t
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Note: Policy functions of the Regulated Economy in % differences (bank capital) and %
deviations (output) from the Unregulated Economy. The shaded areas represent the states of
the economy where the constraint binds in the Regulated Economy.
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economic activity as long as they are not actually binding. In terms of equity accumulation the differences
in the policy functions are small but not insignificant. For instance, when current bank capital is 0.034,
equity accumulation is 0.018 (in % terms) larger in the Regulated Economy, which represents a 0.7% of
the steady state level of equity.
I therefore conclude that the quantitative solution of my model blends the two main views underlying
the on-going discussion and research about the effects of capital requirements.
A subsequent, natural question that emerges is: under which conditions is the minimum capital standard
more likely to be breached? In the model, binding events may be driven by changes in the condition of
the borrowing sector, namely technology shocks. For example, a high level of productivity boosts the
demand for capital working loans as the representative firm enlarges its production capacity. Bank capital,
however, is sticky in the short run, and cannot adjust immediately to the new business environment. As a
consequence, the equity to assets ratio declines ; thereby increasing the prospect of breaching the minimum
capital standard. Likewise, banks may be brought up against the regulatory constraint due to unfavorable
realizations of the bank capital shock. The intuition is straightforward. Adverse financial conditions impair
banks’ net worth, thereby triggering capital shortfalls. Lastly, binding events may be triggered by the
(endogenous) banks’ equity accumulation behavior.
Of course, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. The analysis that follows is designed to deter-
mine which among these factors are the most important sources of binding events. This is a quantitative
question, which I settle by simulating a version of the model in which capital regulation is activated (i.e.
κ = 9%).
To be more precise, I first perform a 500,000 period simulation of the model. Second, I identify all the
quarters in which the constraint binds. Then, I construct a dummy variable equal to 1 when the constraint
binds and 0 otherwise. Third, I estimate a logistic regression. Specifically, I regress my dummy variable
on the four period backward moving average of the productivity shock, the bank capital shock, and bank
equity capital. The results are reported in Table 3.
I begin by considering the realizations of the exogenous disturbances separately (columns 1 and 2),
and find that the fit is not extraordinary. Although both regressors are highly statistically significant, they
account for no more than 13% of the variations in the probability of breaching the minimum capital stan-
dard. Next, I include the moving average of bank equity capital (column 3). Interestingly, in this case the
pseudo-R2 goes up to 31.5%; which highlights the endogenous nature of binding events in the model. To
put it differently, a decline in the accumulation of bank capital over the previous four quarters is indicative
of a heightened risk of breaching the minimum capital standard.
These findings lead to an interesting observation. As expected, the minimum equity threshold can be
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Table 3: Prediction of Binding Events
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
Mov. Aver. ǫ 669.9*** - 363.8***
Mov. Aver. A - 114.5*** 159.1***
Mov. Aver. N - - -5361***
Pseudo-R2 12.79 11.48 31.5
Note: Logit regression using a dummy equal to one when the capital requirement constraint
binds (and zero otherwise) as dependent variable. All models include a constant term. The
regression sample includes 498,996 observations and the bank is constrained in 17% of the
periods. The variables Y , N/L, and rl denote, respectively, output, equity to loans ratio
and the lending rate. Mov. Aver. refers to the 4 periods backwards moving average of the
indicated variable. Reported R2 are the McFadden Pseudo-R2. ***p < 0.01.
reached during periods of financial distress. However, it can also be breached during economic booms.
In these instances, capital regulation can be seen as an automatic stabilizer that limit credit growth in the
upturn of the cycle. This substantiates previous findings in the literature [see e.g. De Nicolo et al. (2012);
Cerutti et al. (2015); Akinci andOlmstead-Rumsey (2015)] that instruments linked to capital buffers restrict
risk taking and reduce the procyclicality of bank credit growth.
4.4 Counterfactuals
This subsection performs two policy counterfactuals to quantitatively gauge the impact of capital regulation
on the Spanish economy. As will become clear, the main benefit from capital regulation is the reduction in
macro-financial volatility.
Counterfactual A: Business Cycle Statistics
I now proceed to use my model to assess the effects of capital requirements on business cycle statistics. To
this end, I conduct a 500,000 period stochastic time series simulation with no regulation in place. Then, I
use the same shock sequence in the counterfactual scenario where capital requirements are active (κ = 9%).
Lastly, I calculate some key statistics of both economies. The results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4 is revealing in several ways. First, the level of output is largely unaffected by the minimum cap-
ital standard. Second, the bank holds, on average, an amount of equity that exceeds the minimum imposed
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by regulation. As was discussed in Section 3, regulatory intervention promotes precautionary behavior by
encouraging banks to build up equity buffers in order to stay clear of the minimum capital standard. The
intuition is straightforward. Within my framework, breaching the minimum capital standard is costly for
banks, because it prevents them from smoothing exogenous disturbances.21 As a result, regulated banks ad-
just their balance sheet structure to reduce the prospect of hitting the constraint. Third, equity requirements
substantially reduce the lending rate. This occurs because capital regulation boosts financial resilience (i.e.
leads to better capitalized banks). This, in turn, increases the confidence of foreign lenders, and hence re-
sults in lower banks’ funding costs. Forth, capital requirements notably reduce macro-financial volatility.
For example, the standard deviations of output and the equity to assets ratio are 1.5% and 67%, respectively,
lower in the Regulated Economy.
Counterfactual B: The Dynamic Effects of Bank Capital Shocks
As mentioned in Section 3, my model considers a specific form of bank equity shortfalls, namely a lump-
sum transfer of resources from banks to firms. Iacoviello (2015) suggests that this shock can be seen as
losses for the banking industry generated, for instance, by a wage of non performing loans. Furthermore, as
noted by Guerrieri et al. (2015), this shock is purely financial, since it does not destruct real resources. As
a result, its macroeconomic consequences can be interpreted as spillover effects from the financial sector
to the real economy.
The next experiment performs a dynamic simulation for both the Regulated Economy and Unregulated
Economy in response to a sequence of default shocks that impairs the balance sheet of the bank. More
precisely, I feed into the model a sequence of unexpected shocks to ut (see Eq.6), each quarter equal to
0.39% of annual outstanding loans, which lasts 16 quarters and causes the ratio loan losses to total loans to
rise from 0% to 1.5%. The shock here mimics the increase in the ratio non-performing loans to gross loans
suffered by Spanish banks from 2007 to 2011. During this period, such a ratio rose from 0.8% to 6%.
Figure 4 plots the generalized impulse response functions as in Koop et al. (1996) in order to take
nonlinearities into account.22 Let me begin by considering the responses of the Unregulated Economy
(solid blue line). The shock damages the bank’s balance sheet by impairing the value of its assets (i.e.
loans minus non performing loans), relative to its liabilities. This strengthens the friction in the market for
21As was mentioned in the Introduction, in the real world when a bank fails to meet its capital requirement, both markets and
regulators may restrict the bank’s activities in several ways [Borio and Zhu (2012)]. For instance, regulators may limit the flow and
size of dividend payments [Furfine (2001)]. Also, depositors might sanction under-capitalized banks by withdrawing deposits or
demanding higher interest rates [Berger and Turk-Ariss (2015)].
22Please refer to Appendix A.4 for details about non linear impulse responses.
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Table 4: Simulated Business Cycle Statistics
Unregulated
Economy
Regulated
Economy
Dev. %
Mean
Yt 0.333 0.334 0.300
Nt/Lt 0.077 0.092 19.48
rlt 0.005 0.001 -80.00
Standard Deviations (%)
Yt 1.341 1.321 -1.565
Nt/Lt 0.633 0.208 -67.40
rlt 0.444 0.128 -71.17
Time at the constraint (%) - 17.15 -
Note: The variables Y , N/L, and rl denote, respectively, output, equity to loans ratio and
the lending rate. Business cycle statistics have been computed from a 500,000 period time
series simulation of the model. The column Dev. % represents the percentage deviation
of the outcome in the Regulated Economy with respect to the outcome in the Unregulated
Economy.
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external funds as foreign investors revise down their view of the domestic financial sector. As a result, the
bank’s funding costs increase. This is passed on to borrowers in the form of higher lending rates. Capital
working loans therefore fall; dragging employment and output down.
In the aggregate, financial vulnerability strongly deteriorates economic performance. Note that the
decline in output is not just large, but also very persistent. Ten years after the initial shock, output is still
0.12% below its long run average.
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Figure 4: Dynamics After a Bank Capital Shock
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Note:The figure depicts the responses of macro-financial aggregates to a shock that leads after 4 years to loan losses for banks equal to 6 percent
(per annum) of total loans. Flow loan losses (solid blue line) are multiplied by 4 to express as a fraction of annual total credit.
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Turning now to the responses of the Regulated Economy (dashed red line), Figure 4 shows that with cap-
ital requirements in place, the same sequence of shocks induce a milder decline in equity capital. Moreover,
it is important to stress that the path of output is persistently lower in the Unregulated Economy compared
to the case when a minimum capital standard is in place.
Two relatedmechanisms are at play. First, as I noted earlier, capital regulation encourages precautionary
behavior. That is, it compels the bank to build up an equity buffer; thus strengthening its balance sheets
and boosting its ability to absorb losses. By doing so, capital regulation leads to easier credit conditions
during periods of financial distress, and hence contains the economic damage of loan losses.
Second, due to the country-risk premium, there exists a pecuniary externality which banks do not
internalize when managing their balance sheets. Specifically, as was mentioned before, individual banks
ignore the effect of their own level of net worth on the country-risk premium. Capital regulation partially
corrects this market failure by forcing banks to maintain a minimum level of net worth. As a matter of fact,
the right bottom panel reveals that the wave of loan losses brings the bank up against the minimum equity
threshold (i.e. the Lagrange multiplier on the capital requirement constraint µt becomes positive). This
in turn contains the decline of bank capital, improves banks’ access to international capital markets, and
lessens the contraction of output.
All told, these findings support the idea that capital requirements are indeed a powerful tool to strengthen
financial resilience. By doing so, equity regulation reduces macro-financial volatility and smooths business
cycle dynamics.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a business cycle model to assess the quantitative relevance of an occasionally binding
bank capital requirement constraint. I focus on financial shocks, because they are now considered as the
likely cause of many economic crisis. However, I also take into account technology shocks, since they are
at the core of the vast majority of dynamic models.
I perform a non-linear analysis, which has two essential benefits. First, I am able to consider the kink
that the occasionally binding constraint imposes on the policy functions of the model. Second, I am able
to capture precautionary behavior linked to the possibility that the constraint may become binding in the
future as a result of shocks yet unrealized.
I use my model to examine three fundamental matters. Firstly, the tradeoff between financial stability
and the cost of financial intermediation associated with capital requirements. Secondly, what factors affect
the likelihood of hitting the constraint. Thirdly, the role of capital regulation in shaping business cycle
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fluctuations.
Considered together, the results of this study suggest that bank capital requirements strengthen the
resilience of the banking sector, and smooth business cycle fluctuations. In other words, bank capital
requirements lead to a considerable stabilization of the macroeconomy.
In spite of the growing literature on macroprudential tools, particularly on capital requirements, many
unknowns still exist, and a large research agenda remains. In order to justify policy intervention, further re-
search on the choice and calibration of prudential regulation is essential. Also, it is crucial to gain evidence
on the quantitatively effectiveness of macroprudential tools to make the policy design more transparent and
accurate.
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Appendix
A.1 Data Description
The dataset includes quarterly and annual data for Spain. The data come from four sources: (i) the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB), (ii) the Central Bank of Spain (BDE), (iii) the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and (iv) the World Bank (WB). Information regarding individual
time series is provided in table 5.
Table 5: Data Sources
Variable Source Period
Gross Domestic Product OECD 97Q3-11Q4
Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator OECD 97Q3-11Q4
Total Employment OECD 97Q3-11Q4
10-year Spanish Government Bond OECD 97Q3-11Q4
10-year German Government Bond OECD 97Q3-11Q4
Net Charge-offs to Assets Ratio of Banks and Credit Finance Es-
tablishments
BDE 97Q3-11Q4
Total Loans of Banks and Credit Finance Establishments BDE 97Q3-11Q4
Equity of Banks and Credit Finance Establishments BDE 97Q3-11Q4
Capital and Reserves of Monetary Financial Institutions ECB 97Q3-11Q4
Total Assets of Monetary Financial Institutions ECB 97Q3-11Q4
Banks’ Non Performing Loans to Gross Loans WB 07A-11A
A.2 Construction of Solow Residuals
Solow residuals are defined as
SRt = log(Yt)− log(Ht),
where Yt denotes real gross domestic product and Ht total employment.
I begin by linearly detrending my empirical measure of labor productivity, SRt. This is done by fitting
a linear and quadratic time trend to the original series. Then I take the measured residuals, which can be
43
Table 6: Discretized State Space
State Variables Lower Bound Upper Bound Grid Points
A A1 A2 2
N 0.6N¯ 1.4N¯ 150
ǫ -0.3N¯ 0.3N¯ 10
Note: Overbar variables refer to the deterministic steady state.
interpreted as the detrended TFP series, and estimate an AR(1) process:
at = ρat−1 + vt,
where a is the detrended Solow residuals. I obtain the following estimates: ρ = 0.956 and the standard
deviation of vt of 0.0029. Lastly, I discretize such a process as a 2-state Markov chain using the approach
laid out in Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
A.3 Solution Method
Themodel is solved using the policy function iteration with time iteration and linear interpolation algorithm
described in Richter et al. (2014). Information regarding the construction of the discretized state space is
provided in Table 6. The continuous state variables are N and ǫ. These are chosen from evenly spaced
grids of 100 values of bank capital, N = {N1 < N2 < ... < N150}, and 10 values of the default shock,
ǫ = {ǫ1 < ǫ2 < ... < ǫ10}. Hence, the state space of the model has 150× 10× 2 nodes.
Under the AR(1) specification for the bank capital shock (see Eq.6), conditional expectations cannot
be computed analytically. Calculation is therefore accomplished via quadrature methods. Specifically, I
use Gauss Hermite quadrature to integrate across ǫt+1. In doing so I use 15 Gauss Hermite nodes for the
exogenous disturbance u.
The following outline summarizes the policy function iteration algorithm I employ. The general pro-
cedure for implementing the algorithm is laid out in Richter et al. (2014).
1. Obtain an initial conjecture forQt on each grid point from the log-linear solution of the model. I use
Chris Sims’ gensys.m program to obtain this conjecture.
2. Using initial guesses and the equilibrium conditions of the model, solve for all time t variables.
3. Using linear interpolation, compute the time t+ 1 value for Qt+1.
4. Calculate the time t+ 1 values of the variables appearing inside time t expectations.
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5. Compute conditional expectations.
6. Minimize the Euler equations. To this end, I use Chris Sims’ csolve.m optimization routine. The
output of csolve.m is the updated decision rules.
7. If the distance between the updated and guessed policy values is smaller than a tolerance parameter,
an approximation to the decision rules has been obtained. Otherwise, employ the updated policy
function as the new initial conjecture and return to step 2.
A.4 Non-linear Impulse Response Functions
The general procedure for calculating non-linear or generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) can
be found in Koop et al. (1996). The reader is referred there for a formal statistical background.
As remarked by Weise (1999), there are four major differences between the impulse responses origi-
nated from a linear model and those generated from a nonlinear model. First, linear impulse responses are
invariant to history, whereas nonlinear responses are state-dependent. In other words, nonlinear responses
are sensitive to initial conditions. As a result, in the nonlinear case the history of shocks must be treated as
a random variable.
Second, in the linear case future shocks can be set to their expected value -that is, to zero. This is not
the case for nonlinear models: future shocks must be drawn from a particular distribution and their effects
averaged out over a large number of draws.
Third, linear responses are invariant to the size of the shock. In contrast, in nonlinear model distur-
bances of different sizes give rise to different impulse responses.
Fourth, linear responses are symmetric. That is, the responses to positive and negative disturbances are
mirror images of each other. This is not the case for nonlinear models.
For all of the foregoing reasons, impulse responses generated from nonlinear models should be calcu-
lated as the average ofMonte Carlo simulations of the model [Gavin et al. (2015)]. The following algorithm
is used to compute the generalized impulse response functions:
1. The model is simulated N times conditional on N random histories of shocks, ΞA = {At, ut}
T
t=0.
Let x¯At =
1
N
∑N
i=0 x
i
t(Ξ
A) be the average across these simulations.
2. The first τ , for τ = 1, ..., τ∗, elements of each history of shocks are replaced by the τ shocks of
interest. A new collection of exogenous disturbances, ΞB , is therefore created.
3. The model is (re-)simulated conditional on ΞB . Let x¯Bt =
1
N
∑N
i=0 x
i
t(Ξ
B) be the average across the
second set of simulations.
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4. GIRFs may then be defined in percentage change as (x¯Bt /x¯
A
t − 1) ∗ 100 or in percentage difference
as (x¯Bt − x¯
A
t ) ∗ 100.
In this paper, I set T to 40 and N to 40,000.
A.5 Spain’s Risk Premium and Financial Resilience
At the core of themodel is the negative link between interest rates and financial vulnerability. Figure 5 offers
historical evidence of how Spain’s country spread relates to the health of the banking sector. Specifically,
it plots Spain’s risk premium23 and the bank capital to loans ratio of Spanish banks from 1980 to 2015.
As expected, the figure shows a clear inverse relationship between both magnitudes (there is a statistically
significant cross-correlation of -0.34). To put it differently, sovereign bond spreads, and hence overall
funding costs, have historically reacted to the leverage ratio of the Spanish banking industry (or equivalently,
to their capability to pay back obligations). This historical evidence lends support to the idea that: as
financial vulnerability increases, the market revises down its view of Spain’s economic outlook, and hence
sovereign spreads rise.
A.6 Grid Search Method
This subsection shows that the optimization problem to estimate ψ1 is well defined. To this end, Figure
6 plots the value of the criterion function, Ω, in the neighborhood of the solution, ψ1 = 16, 329. The
figure suggests that the existence of local minima can be excluded; thereby corroborating the validity of
me methodology.
A.7 Interest Rates and Bank Capital
My model assumes that the interest rate, rft , is a decreasing function of the cross-sectional average level
of bank equity capital, Nˆt. As was noted in Section 3, I opt for the logistic function (see eq.15). After the
calibration exercise, the relationship between rft and Nˆt is given by:
rft = 0.01[1 + e
16,329(Nˆt−0.025)]−1,
which is depicted in Figure 7.
23Spain’s risk premium is the spread between 10-year Spanish government bond, and the 10-year German bond. Given that the
German bond is considered a risk-free asset, the spread is the premium paid for the risk of default.
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Figure 5: Spain’s Risk Premium and Financial Resilience
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Note: Dynamics of Spain’s risk premium and the bank capital to loans ratio of Spanish
banks and credit finance establishments. Spain’s risk premium is the spread between 10-
year Spanish government bond, and the 10-year German bond. The sample contains the
period 1980-2015. Data are at a quarterly frequency and are reported in % terms.
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Figure 6: The Criterion Function in the neigborhood of the global minimum
Selected grid points ψ
1
×10
4
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
C
ri
te
ri
o
n
 f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
 Ω
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Global minimum
 ψ
1
=16,329
Note: The figure exhibits the value of the criterion function, Ω, in the neighborhood of the
global minimum, ψ1 = 16, 329.
Figure 7: Interest Rates and Bank Capital
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Note: The figure shows the relationship between interest rates, rft , and the cross-sectional
level of bank capital, Nˆt, when ψ0 = 0.01, ψ1 = 16, 329 and N¯ = 0.025.
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Chapter 2
Interbank Exposure Limits in a
Dynamic Model of Banking
Abstract
The 2008 crisis and the ensuing Great Recession have prompted a reconsideration of economic policy
and financial regulation. The development of a policy framework responsible for financial stability is at
the forefront of the policy agenda. Motivated by this fact, I propose a stochastic dynamic model with
heterogeneous banks. I then use the model to study the effectiveness of interbank exposure limits. My
principal finding is that such a macroprudential instrument can be a powerful tool to promote financial
resilience.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, strengthening financial resilience has risen to the top of the policy agenda. Conse-
quently, there is nowadays a renewed focus on macroprudential policies, i.e. those tools aiming to mitigate
boom-bust patterns and systemic risk. Nonetheless, policymakers are still a long way from elaborating an
efficient operational framework responsible for financial stability.
Knowledge onwhich instruments and how to employ them to address systemic risk is limited [Claessens
(2015)]. Neither is much known about how macropudential tools should be adapted to economic and
financial conditions. Questions also arise about the quantitative effects and potential costs on the real
economy of those policies. For instance, says Yellen (2014): “Experience with macroprudential tools
remains limited, and we have much to learn to use these measures effectively”.
The objective of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of interbank exposure limits. To this end,
I propose a formal stochastic dynamic model of how banks with rational expectations optimally manage
their balance sheets.
I require a set-up which can incorporate a large number of banks, each with a unique risk/return port-
folio. Obviously, if banks were identical, there would be no interbank market by definition. In addition,
bank heterogeneity captures the fact that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed strongly
depends on its interactions with other banks [Goodhart et al. (2006)]. In this sense, aggregate risk is mainly
endogenous risk steaming from the joint behavior of market participants, and not just the sum of individual
risks [Nicolo et al. (2012)].
In reality episodes of financial distress often occur among the riskiest banks. Such episodes in turn
produce interactions in the system that may threaten the health of other banks: a process of contagion.
Despite this may have several channels1, the interbank lending market is one the most important ones
[Batiz-Zuk et al. (2016)]. As a result, interbank exposure limits are increasingly being used [Cerutti et al.
(2017)]. However, very little is known about their design, calibration and quantitative effect. For example,
BCBS (2010) states: “ there is no single correct approach to determine the adequate calibration, a single
model may not provide the right answer, and results should be interpreted with care”.
My chief innovation is to study the macro-financial consequences of interbank exposure limits in a
quantitative micro-founded model that considers the endogenous interactions among a large number of
banks. In effect, most quantitative macroeconomic models view the banking sector as a single entity [see
1For example, contagion effects may occur via changes in asset market flows and prices [see e.g. Goodhart et al. (2005) and
Allen et al. (2010)]
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e.g. Gertler et al. (2012) and Iacoviello (2015)]; thereby (i) ignoring the interactions between financial
institutions, and (ii) ruling out the existence of an interbank market. Therefore, they are not well suited
to analyze the effectiveness of interbank exposure limits. As for the strand of literature using the tools
of network analysis, the principal flaw is that they lack behavioral foundations [Upper (2011)]. That is,
they assume that banks do not respond to changes in macro-financial conditions. Instead, banks sit tight
as problems at their counterparts mount. Consequently, they cannot be used in stress testing exercises, in
cost benefit analysis or in the analysis of policy options [Batiz-Zuk et al. (2016)].
Three main findings emerge from my analysis. First, interbank exposure limits reduce the risk of con-
tagion. That is, they restrict the interdependence of the banking sector, and hence curbs the propagation of
idiosyncratic shocks. Second, exposure limits promote precautionary behavior and thus leads to a better
capitalized banking sector. In other words, they encourage banks to build equity buffers to minimize the
likelihood of hitting the regulatory constraint. Third, exposure limits occasionally reduce the efficiency of
the interbank market; thereby preventing the optimal allocation of resources. My model predicts that such
distortions should not be overlooked.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 explains
how the model is calibrated against US data and present numerical results. The final section concludes.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The economy is populated by I banks whose identity is de-
noted by i. Banks are heterogeneous with respect to wealth holdings, loan balances, deposit balances,
productivity and the proportion of non performing loans.
The Balance Sheet
Each and every period, bank i ∈ I invests in loans to the nonfinancial sector, lit, lends or borrows in the
interbank market,mit, receives an amount of deposits, d
i
t, and manages a volume e
i
t of equity capital. Thus,
the balance sheet identity is:
lit = m
i
t + d
i
t + e
i
t, (1)
51
which must hold at all times t. Importantly, equity capital is an endogenous state variable (i.e. it is prede-
termined at time t). The amount of deposits, dit, is randomly determined
2 according to:
dit = d¯
i
(
dit−1/d¯
i
)ρd
exp(εd,t), (2)
where εd,t ∼ i.i.d N (0, σ
2
d), |ρd| < 1 and d¯
i > 0.
The Evolution of Equity Capital
Similarly to Zhu (2008) and De Nicolo et al. (2014), banks differ in their ability to extract net revenue from
loans. Formally, the net revenue is given by3:
f(At, a
i, li, ψit) = Ata
i
tl
i
t − l
i
t
2
/2− ψitl
i
t. (3)
Here, AT is an aggregate productivity shock. It follows an AR(1) process:
At = (At−1)
ρAexp(εA,t), (4)
where εA,t ∼ i.i.d N (0, σ
2
A) and |ρA| < 1. In addition, the term a
i is an idiosyncratic productivity shock,
which evolves according to:
ait = (a
i
t−1)
ρaexp(εa,t), (5)
where εa,t ∼ i.i.d N (0, σ
2
a) and |ρa| < 1. As for ψ
i
t, it represents the proportion of non performing loans.
It follows an i.i.d. process:
ψit = exp(εψ,t), (6)
where εψ,t ∼ i.i.d N (µψ, σ
2
ψ). A point here deserves further comment. I assume that l
i
t is chosen before
ψit is revealed.
4 Consequently, banks must form expectations about it. It can easily be shown that E(ψit) =
eµψ+σ
2
ψ
/2
. This modeling device allows me to consider unexpected bank capital losses.
To restrict banks’ ability to accumulate enough capital to fund all assets internally, I assume that they
face quadratic adjustment costs when the current level of equity differs from its long run value, e¯. Formally,
adjustment costs are represented as:
c(eit) = τ(e
i
t − e¯)
2, (7)
2This assumption is standard. See, for example, De Nicolo et al. (2014) and Covas and Driscoll (2014).
3The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is standard in the literature and empirically supported [see e.g. Cole et al. (2004);
Berger et al. (2005); Carter and McNulty (2005)].
4Examples of analyses which make this type of information assumption can be found in Tirole (2006).
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where τ ≥ 0. These costs are needed to guarantee stationarity of the state variables.5
Bank i either borrows (mit > 0) or lends (m
i
t < 0) on the interbank market. Let φt be the average
repayment rate on such a market.6 Ifmit < 0, equity capital evolves by:
eit+1 = l
i
t − φtm
i
t − d
i
t + f(At, a
i, li, ψit)− c(e
i
t)− r
ddit − φtr
m
t m
i
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Operating Profits
−qit. (8)
Here qit represents dividend payments to shareholders. r
d is the interest rate of deposits, which for sim-
plicity is assumed to be constant. rmt is the interest rate on the interbank market. Its value is determined
so that the aggregate position of all banks on the interbank market is zero.
In contrast, if bank i borrow on the interbank market (i.e. mit > 0), the evolution of equity capital is
not affected by the overall repayment rate, φt:
eit+1 = l
i
t −m
i
t − d
i
t + f(At, a
i, li, ψit)− c(e
i
t)− r
ddit − r
m
t m
i
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Operating Profits
−qit. (9)
Interbank Exposure Limits
Interbank exposure limits aim to reduce the risk of contagion by restricting banks’ actions on the interbank
market [Cerutti et al. (2017)]. I model exposure limits as an occasionally binding borrowing constraint on
the interbank market:
mit ≤ γ ⇒ l
i
t ≤ d
i
t + e
i
t + γ, (10)
where γ is a positive policy parameter. Note that the constraint can be viewed as an endogenous upper
bound on banks’ loans partly determined by the amount of equity capital. In other words, the prudential
policy I propose has the flavor of a bank capital requirement constraint.
Banks’ maximization problem
Banks’ preferences over dividend streams {qit}
∞
t=0 are evaluated via and expected utility criterion:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtlog(1 + qit), (11)
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for alternative ways of obtaining this.
6The model considers a “complete” structure of claims on the interbank market. That is, every bank has symmetric exposures
to all other banks. As a result, all lenders face the same proportion of defaulted claims.
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As noted by Bianchi and Bigio (2014), introducing curvature into the objective function is essential. This
assumption produces smooth dividends and slow-moving bank capital, as observed empirically.7 There-
fore, banks choose sequences {lit,m
i
t, q
i
t}
∞
t=0 to maximize eq.11 subject to eq.1, eq.8 (or eq.9), and eq.10.
Default
Banks are allowed to default. Specifically, bank i defaults if its end of period equity, eit+1, drops below
zero. In these instances, not all liabilities are repaid. I assume that deposit liabilities are senior to interbank
liabilities.8 Let J be the total number of banks that borrow on the interbank market. The repayment rate
of bank j ∈ J is then given by:
φjt =
m˜jt
mjt
with m˜jt =

 m
j
t if e
j
t+1 > 0
max[0,mjt + e
j
t+1] if e
j
t+1 < 0
. (12)
In words, if end of period equity, ejt+1, is positive, bank j repays its debts on the interbank market in full
(i.e. m˜jt = m
j
t and φ
j
t = 1). However, if the bank fails (i.e. e
j
t+1 < 0), shareholders exercise the limited
liability option, and not all debts are repaid (i.e. m˜jt < m
j
t ). The aggregate repayment rate is computed as
the average across banks:
φt =
1
J
J∑
j=1
φjt (13)
To keep the model simple, I follow De Nicolo et al. (2014), and assume that right after default, a new
bank is formed with initial public capital eˆ, in order to conserve intermediation services.
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists on sequences of aggregates variables {rmt , φt}
∞
t=0 and individual vari-
ables {lit,m
i
t, e
i
t, q
i
t}
∞
t=0 ∀i ∈ I such that:
1. Banks’ policy functions solve their maximization problems (i.e. all banks optimize).
2. The interbank market clears: ∑
i
mit = 0 (14)
7This kind of preferences are usually found in the corporate finance literature. One way to rationalize these preferences is
through agency frictions that might give rise to capital adjustment costs [Estrella (2004)]. Slow-moving equity can also be obtained
by directly assuming capital adjustment costs.
8This assumption is widely used in the literature on contagion in financial markets [Upper (2011)].
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3. φt satisfies eq.13.
3 The Quantitative Analysis
I now resort to numerical simulations to explore the effectiveness of interbank exposure limits. The com-
putational strategy is laid out in Appendix 1. Accuracy checks are provided in Appendix 2.
In this section two economies are often compared. The first economy (my baseline) features an exposure
limit and is labeled the Regulated Economy. The second economy is similar to the baseline except that it is
not subject to financial regulation. This is done by setting the policy parameter, γ, to infinity. This economy
is labeled the Unregulated Economy.
3.1 Calibration
The values assigned to the model’s parameters are listed in Table 1. The model is calibrated against US
annual data. Details on the data are provided in appending A.3.
The total number of banks9 is 100. The discount factor is set to 0.96, a number often used in dynamic
macroeconomic models. In terms of the parameters associated with the aggregate productivity shock, I
set ρA = 0.85 and σA = 0.03. I have chosen these values to be consistent with the following outcomes.
First, the model-implied standard deviation of total lending is roughly 0.03. Second, the model yields a
first order serial autocorrelation coefficient of total lending close to 0.8. These values correspond to the
moments of the total credit to the private non-financial sector from 1988 to 2016.
Regarding the parameters linked to the idiosyncratic productivity shock, I set ρa = 0.9 and σa = 0.095.
These values are selected so that roughly 1% of banks fail each period. This number corresponds to the
proportion of commercial banks and saving institutions that failed or required assistance transactions from
1984 to 2015. With respect to the parameters associated with the deposit shock, I set ρd to 0.8 and σd to
0.02. These values are obtained by fitting a first order autoregressive process to the total amount of deposits
in the US economy from 1980 to 2016.
In terms of the parameters governing the proportion of non performing loans ψit, I set µψ to−3.99 and
σψ to 0.61. These values are obtained by fitting a log normal distribution to the ratio non performing loans
to total loans in the US economy from 1988 to 2016.
The steady state level of bank capital, e¯, is not uniquely pinned down by the parameter values. There-
fore, I set it to match the average of the ratio between equity capital and total assets of commercial banks.
9The results are robust to the choice of this parameter.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Calibration
Parameter Symbol Value
Total number of banks I 100
Discount factor β 0.96
Interest rate deposits rd 0.04
Aggregate productivity persistence ρA 0.85
Aggregate productivity standard deviation σA 0.03
Idiosyncratic productivity persistence ρa 0.90
Idiosyncratic productivity standard deviation σa 0.09
Deposit persistence ρd 0.80
Deposit standard deviation σd 0.02
Mean default shock µψ -3.99
Standard deviation default shock σψ 0.61
Steady state equity capital e¯ 0.07
Interbank exposure limits γ 1.03
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From 1980 to 2016, this value was roughly 8%. As for the equity adjustment cost parameter, τ , I set it to
the minimum value that guarantees that the equilibrium solution is stationary.
The parameter governing the tightness of exposure limits, γ, is chosen to be consistent with the follow-
ing outcome: when in place, the instrument binds in roughly 20% of the periods.10
It remains to specify the long run equilibrium properties of the interbank market. I assume that the
ratio total loans in the interbank market to total loans to the non financial sector equals 0.5. This value
corresponds to the average ratio financial commercial paper outstanding to commercial and industrial loans
from 2001 to 2016. In addition, I suppose that in steady state half of the banks borrow on the interbank
market, while the other half lends.11
3.2 Evaluating the Quantitative Model
I first assess the ability of the model to account for US financial cycle facts. I begin by simulating a 50,000
period time series, and then calculate key statistical moments. Table 2 reports the results.
Generally, the financial cycle moments of the model are approximately in line with the data. More
precisely, the model does a fair job at matching the volatility of the leverage ratio and of total lending.
Also, the model captures the fact that roughly 1% of banks default each period. In addition, it does well at
matching the serial autocorrelations. To be sure, there are some discrepancies between the model and the
data. For example, the interest rate is slightly more volatile in the model than in the data. Another failure
of the model is that the series for the interest rate is not persistent enough.
All told, the model seems to be consistent with US financial cycle features. I am of the opinion that
this observation emphasizes its validity for analyzing the effectiveness interbank exposure limits.
3.3 Decision Rules
Let me now explore how the decision rules of the model are affected by interbank exposure limits. Figure
1 depicts the policy function for individual lending, lit, as a function of idiosyncratic productivity, a
i
t when
{eit, d
i
t,
∑
i e
i
t, r
m
t , ψ
i
t} are centered around their steady state values.
As idiosyncratic productivity increases from low levels, banks’ ability to extract revenue from loans
augments. Consequently, they invest more on loans. Given that deposits are an exogenous variable and
10The tightness of regulatory policy can be treated as an input given by the users of model. My choice is justified by the Senior
Loan Officer Opinion Survey, which suggest that banks are constrained by capital regulation in roughly 20% of the periods [Covas
and Driscoll (2014)].
11To this end, I assume that the steady state level of deposits, d¯i, is low for the first half of banks, and high for the second half.
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Table 2: Empirical and Simulated Moments
Data Model
Standard Deviation(%)
Leverage ratio 2.05 1.92
Total lending 3.79 2.91
Interest rate 2.70 4.41
Autocorrelation
Leverage ratio 0.78 0.82
Total lending 0.83 0.85
Interest rate 0.88 0.72
Average (%)
Bank failures 0.92 1.35
Note: The first column presents statistical moments of the US annual data. The-
oretical moments are based on a 50,000 period time series simulation of the
model.
equity is predetermined at time t, the extra lending is financed by borrowing in the interbank market.
Exposure limits clearly affect these dynamics. Specifically, they restrict the amount that banks can borrow
on the interbank market. As a result, they actually impose an upper bound on banks’ loans.
Thus, Figure 1 illustrates a clear tradeoff. On the one hand, exposure limits can have a negative impact
on the efficiency of the interbank market in allocating banks’ idiosyncratic shocks. On the other hand, they
can reduce the interdependence of the banking sector, and hence lower the risk of contagion.
3.4 Stress Testing Analysis
In this subsection I perturb certain exogenous variables and trace out the dynamic responses of the model.
The emphasis is on how the behavior of the banking industry is affected by interbank exposure limits. The
results are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the model.12
12Please refer to Appendix 4 for more details about the methodology.
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Figure 1: Policy Function for Loans
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Idiosyncratic Bank Failures
I first analyze the role of exposure limits in reducing the risk of contagion. To this end, I conduct a simple
experiment:
1. I first select a group of 5 banks who in steady state are borrowers on the interbank market.
2. I then feed them with a sequence of 4 positive productivity shocks. Formally, I set εia,t = 0.15 for
t = 1, 2, 3, 4 and i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
3. Lastly, I assume that at t = 4, a set of default shocks destroys 50% of their loans. That is, I suppose
that ψi4 = 0.5 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Table 3 summarizes the percentage deviations from the steady state in total equity,
∑
i e
i
t, and in the average
equity of the lenders on the interbank market, 1J
∑
j e
j
t , where J is the number of lenders, at the time of
the default shocks and one period afterwards.
The sequence of positive productivity shocks encourage the group of 5 banks to expand their lending
(see Figure 1). As noted above, deposits are exogenous and equity capital is a predetermined slow-moving
variable. In consequence, banks turn to the interbank market to fund the new loans.13 In this scenario, the
13This notion is supported by the corporate finance and banking literature showing that core liabilities (i.e. traditional deposits
and equity capital) are sticky, and as a result, do not keep up with the expansion of balance sheets during booms [Harutyunyan et al.
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Table 3: Idiosyncratic Bank Failures
% Dev. from Steady State
Time T Time T + 1
Reg.Ec. Unr. Ec. Reg.Ec. Unr. Ec.
Total Equity -25.7 -36.4 -19.0 -22.0
Average Equity Lenders in Inter. Market -14.6 -27.3 -8.66 -12.5
Note: Reg. Ec. and Unr. Ec. stand for Regulated Economy and Unregulated Economy respectively. The table
summarizes the percentage deviations from the steady state in the value of total equity and the average equity of the
lenders on the interbank market following a series of idiosyncratic bank failures.
interbank market allows for a better allocation of resources. However, it also increases the interdependence
of the banking sector; thereby potentially undermining financial stability.
In effect, once the group of 5 banks is hit by the default shock and thus fail, the interbank market
propagates the losses to the entire banking sector. Indeed, Table 3 reveals that aggregate equity falls more
than 25%. The table also shows that the average equity of lenders in the interbank market significantly
decreases. Remarkably, such a decline is solely due to contagion effects, since these banks have not been
directly hit by any shock.
Regulatory intervention clearly alleviates the negative consequences of these dynamics. As can be
seen from the table, the reduction in total equity and in the average equity of lenders is notable lower in
the Regulated Economy. The intuition is straightforward. Exposure limits restrict the amount banks can
borrow on the interbank market. By doing so, this policy reduces the transaction volume on such a market;
thereby lessening the degree of interdependence in the banking sector. As a result, interbank exposure
limits strengthen the resilience to contagion effects.
To see this point more clearly, Figure 2 depicts the densities of equity capital of the banks that lend
on the interbank market.14 The figure clearly illustrates the crucial role of interbank exposure limits in
reducing the risk of contagion. In effect, it can be seen that the shift to the left of the density function at
time t is much more pronounced in the Regulated Economy.
(2015)].
14Recall that these banks have not been hit by any exogenous shock. Therefore, the variations in their net worth is only due to
interactive contagion effects.
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Figure 2: Density Functions
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Note: The figure shows theWeibull probability density function of equity
capital of the banks that lend at on the interbank market at time t.
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Idiosyncratic Productivity Shocks
I now proceed to analyze the potential costs associated with interbank exposure limits. To this end, I
suppose that a groups of 5 banks experiences a positive shock, εia,t, so that idiosyncratic productivity
increases by 20% at time t. Formally, I set εia,t = 0.2 for i = 1, ..., 5. Figure 3 plots the histograms of
individual lending and interbank borrowing of these 5 banks.
As their ability to extract net revenue from loans augments, the 5 banks increase their borrowing in
the interbank market, and use these additional funds to expand their lending to the nonfinancial sector.
Therefore, there is a transfer of resources in the interbank market from less to more productive banks.
It is apparent from Figure 3 that exposure limits distort the workings of the interbank market. More
precisely, regulatory intervention prevents the most productive banks from obtaining their desired level of
funds; thereby forcing them to cut back on lending. For instance, note the significant differences between
the dashed red line and the solid blue line in the right-middle panel of Figure 3. These differences are due
to the fact that in the Regulated Economy the most productive banks hit the exposure limit constraint (see
the left-middle panel), and are forced to reduce their credit supply.
All told, the figure is a clear example of how exposure limits may reduce the efficiency of the interbank
market and thus prevent the optimal allocation of resources.
3.5 The Long Run Equilibrium
A subsequent, natural question that emerges is: are the costs of exposure limits significant in the long run?
Put differently, is there a steady state negative impact of exposure limits? To address this issue, I simulate
a 100, 000 period time series and calculate some key statistical indicators. Table 4 presents the results.
The table is revealing in several ways. First, aggregate lending is slightly lower in the Regulated Econ-
omy. This confirms the notion that exposure limits occasionally prevent the optimal allocation of resources;
thereby hindering the supply of credit. Second, regulated banks are on average better capitalized. The ba-
sic logic is as follows. As was discussed in Section 2, exposure limits can be viewed as an endogenous
upper bound on banks’ loans partly determined by the amount of equity capital. In consequence, regulated
banks buildup equity buffers in order to stay clear of the regulatory constraint. In other words, exposure
limits encourage precautionary behavior. Third, regulatory intervention reduces the risk of contagion; thus
decreasing the frequency of episodes of financial distress and capital shortfalls. To see this point more
clearly, note that the Regulated Economy features a notably lower proportion of bank failures each period.
Fourth, exposure limits reduce financial volatility. For example, the standard deviation of total lending and
the leverage ratio are 11.7% and 39%, respectively, lower in the Regulated Economy.
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Figure 3: Histograms
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banks hit by a positive productivity shock at time t. Each bin value is the count of observations over the total number
of observations. Therefore, the sum of the bar heights equals 1.
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Table 4: Long Run Equilibrium
Regulated Econ. Unregulated Econ. Dev. %
Average
Total Lending 92.5 94.5 -2.11
Leverage Ratio 9.38 9.15 2.51
Interest Rate 0.06 0.06 0.00
Bank failures (%) 1.10 1.35 -18.5
Standard Deviation (%)
Total Lending 2.57 2.91 -11.7
Leverage ratio 1.17 1.92 -39.0
Interest rate 4.51 4.41 2.26
Note: The column Dev. % represents the percentage deciation of the outcome in the Regulated Economy with
respect to the Unregulated Economy. The leverage ratio is defined as the aggregate level of equity,
∑
i
ei
t
, divided
by the total lending to the nonfinancial sector,
∑
i
li
t
. Bank failures represent the percentage of banks that default
each period.
To emphasize the effects of exposure limits on the capitalization of the banking sector, Fig 4 plots
the density of the leverage ratio. Remarkably, the density in the Regulated Economy is tilted to the right
(i.e. the left tails is thinner and the right tail is fatter) when compared with the density in the Unregulated
Economy. To put it differently, the frequency of episodes in which the banking sector is in distress is lower
in the Regulated Economy.
I conclude this section with the overall assessment that interbank exposure limits do boost financial
resilience. However, their negative effects on the supply of credit ought not to be overlooked.
4 Concluding Remarks
The recent wave of financial and economic crises has prompted a rethink of financial regulation. Motivated
by this, I propose a stochastic dynamic model with heterogeneous banks. I then use the model to assess the
effectiveness of interbank exposure limits.
My findings suggest that interbank exposure limits can be a powerful tool to strengthen financial re-
silience. Two mechanisms are at play. First, exposure limits reduce the risk of contagion between financial
institutions by restricting the interdependence of the banking sector. Second, exposure limits encourages
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Figure 4: Leverage Ratio Density Function
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Note: The figure shows the Weibull probability density function of the aggregate leverage
ratio. The density is computed via a 100,000 periods simulation.
precautionary behavior by promoting the buildup of equity buffers. However, my results indicates that the
negative impact of this policy tool on the supply of credit should not be underestimated.
In spite of the growing literature on macroprudential tools many unknowns still exist, and a large re-
search agenda remains. In order to justify policy intervention, further research on the choice and calibration
of prudential regulation is essential. Also, it is crucial to gain evidence on the quantitatively effectiveness
of macroprudential tools to make the policy design more transparent and accurate. In addition, the inces-
sant progress in the solution of quantitative macroeconomic models with micro heterogeneity makes this
field a highly stimulating area for future research.
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A.1 Computation Strategy
The model is solved using a parameterized expectation algorithm. It is important to notice that the policy
functions of agent i ∈ I depend on the cross-sectional wealth distribution. Then, if I is large, the dimension
of the state space explodes. To overcome this problem, I follow Krusell and Smith (1998) and Den Haan
(1996), and approximate the wealth distribution using moments. An outline of the algorithm will now be
given.15
1. I first generate the exogenous stochastic processes {At, d
i
t, a
i
t, ψ
i
t}
T=8000
t=0 for i = 1, ..., I .
2. I then iterate to find the coefficients of the parameterized expectation. I begin by replacing the con-
ditional expectations of the banks’ inter-temporal optimality conditions with:
Ψ = exp

θ0 + θ1log(ait) + θ2log(1 + dit) + θ3log(1 + eit) + θ4log(∑
i
eit) + θ5log(At)


The iterations begin with an initial value for {θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4}. The iteration procedure is as follows:
(a) Using the exogenous driving processes and the functionΨ, I simulate the economy for T = 8000
periods. A golden-section search16 is used to find the value of the interest rate on the interbank
market, rmt , such that
∑
im
i
t = 0 ∀t.
(b) Update the coefficients of the approximating polynomial. As was discussed in the calibration
exercise, I suppose that in steady state half of the banks borrow on the interbank market, while
the other half lends. It is natural to think that the forecasting rules of banks belonging to these
two groups might be slightly different. Therefore, I estimate two forecasting rules: one for banks
that in steady state borrow in the interbank market and one for banks that lend.
(c) I iterate until
max

θn+1j − θnj
1 +
∣∣∣θnj ∣∣∣

 < 0.0001
where n refers to the number of the iteration, and j = 0, ..., 4.
A.2 Accuracy Checks
This section checks the accuracy of the numerical algorithm. I assess the intertemporal error banks make
when they form expectations according to the approximate solution. This error is measured by the residual,
15The detailed procedure can be found in Den Haan (1996).
16More precisely, I use the Matlab function fminbnd.
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uit, of the Euler equation for equity capital. Let η
i
t be the Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion for net
worth. In the absence of regulatory intervention, uit is given by
17:
uit = η
i
t − βEt

ηit+1
[
1 + rmt+1 −
dc(eit+1)
deit+1
] .
For clarity, the Euler residual is normalized by the level of dividends. Thus, uit/q
i
t captures the loss in
terms of dividends banks experience by relying on the approximate solution rather than on the true one. I
first compute uit at each grid point. Then, I compute the following statistic:
Υ = log10
[
E
∣∣∣∣∣u
i
t
qit
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= −3.08
This means that a bank with $1220 of dividends makes on average a one-dollar error in current dividends
in each period relative to the next period’s dividends. From an economic point of view, these errors can be
seen as small enough to consider the approximation as accurate.
A.3 Data Description
The dataset includes annual data for the US. The data come from three sources: (i) the Federal Reserve
Bank of ST. Louis (FRED), (ii) the Financial Accounts of the US (FA), and (iii) the Federal Depository
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Information regarding individual time series is provided in table 5.
A.4 Stress Testing Analysis
This section describes the procedure for performing the stress testing analysis. The results are computed
as the average Monte Carlo simulations of the model. Specifically, the following algorithm is used:
1. Generate N random histories of exogenous shocks ΞA = {At, a
i
t, d
i
t, ψ
i}Tt=0.
2. The first τ , for τ = 1, ..., τ∗, elements of each history of shocks are replaced by the τ shocks of
interest. A new collection of exogenous disturbances, ΞB , is therefore created.
3. The model is simulated conditional on ΞB . Let x¯Bt =
1
N
∑N
i=0 x
i
t(Ξ
B) be the average across these
simulations. Here x¯Bt is a vector containing the endogenous variables of the model.
4. The stress testing exercise studies the statistical properties of x¯Bt .
In this paper, I set N to 10,000.
17The accuracy of the solution is not significantly modified by the introduction of exposure limits.
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Table 5: Data Sources
Variable Source Period Transformation
12-months London Interbank Offered Rate FRED 88-16 N/A
Commercial & Industrial Loans FRED 89-16 N/A
Financial Commercial Paper Outstanding FRED 01-16 N/A
Nonperforming Total Loans to Total Loans FRED 88-16 N/A
Total Deposits FRED 88-16 HP
Total Credit to Private Nonfinancial Sector FRED 88-16 HP
Total Failure and Assistance Transactions FDIC 84-15 N/A
Total Equity of Domestic Financial Sectors FA 88-16 N/A
Total Assets of Domestic Financial Sectors FA 88-16 N/A
Note: HP: Hodrick Prescott filter. N/A: not applicable. Note that some variables are used to construct ratios and hence
do not need to be transformed.
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Chapter 3
State-dependent Risk Taking and the
Transmission of Monetary Policy
Shocks1
Abstract
Is risk taking an important channel by which monetary policy shocks affect economic activity? On the
basis of a nonlinear structural VAR including a new measure of risk sensitivity by economic agents, we
show that the role of the risk-taking channel depends on the state of the economy. While it is irrelevant
during recession or normal times, it acts as an amplifier by boosting output during expansion. It means
that, as long as monetary policy does not actively “lean against the wind”, it may exacerbate boom-bust
patterns.
1The content of this work is an extended version of the paper by Patrick Fe`ve, Pablo Garcia and Jean-Guillaume Sahuc: State-
dependent risk taking and the transmission of monetary policy shocks, Economics Letters, Volume 164, 2018, Pages 10-14.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, the relationship between monetary policy and the risk
appetite of economic agents has been pointed out. Market observers have claimed that the prolonged
period of low interest rates under favorable economic and financial conditions in the early 2000s might
have produced overconfidence by economic agents, (i) increasing dramatically their risk tolerance and (ii)
contributing to financial imbalances. This mechanism, called the risk-taking channel of monetary policy,
can have long lasting adverse consequences on economic activity if it is neglected (Borio and Zhu (2012)
and Diamond and Rajan (2012), among others).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the importance of the risk-taking channel in the propagation
of monetary policy shocks to the US economy. To this end, we build an indicator of risk sensitivity and
introducing it together with output and a measure of the monetary policy stance in a logistic vector smooth
transition autoregressive model (LVSTAR, Terasvirta et al. (2010)). Using a standard identification scheme
formonetary policy shocks (Christiano et al. (1999)), we find that the role of the risk-taking channel depends
on the state of the economy. During recession or normal times, it has a small effect on the transmission of
monetary policy shocks to economic activity. However, during economic booms the risk-taking channel
acts as an amplifier by boosting output. Excessive risk appetites may potentially lead to boom-bust patterns.
Central banks should then account for this channel when adjusting their policy in order to mitigate the
adverse consequence of their decisions on economic activity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the risk sensitivity indicator. Sections 3
and 4 describe the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Risk Taking
I aim to assess the resilience of the overall financial system, which crucially depends on the underlying
health of all sectors of the economy (see e.g. Hatzius et al. (2010); Ampudia et al. (2016) and Bernstein
et al. (2017)). To this end, I construct a coincidence risk sensitivity indicator.
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2.1 Dynamic Factor Analysis
The index is basically a weighted average of a set of financial variables. Factor analysis is used to estimate
the weight given to each indicator.2 Formally, the index, Ft, is estimated using the following state space
representation:
Ωt = ΓFt + ηt, (1)
Ft = ρFt−1 + vt, (2)
whereΩt is a vector of stationary variables that have been demeaned and standardized. ηt is an idiosyncratic
error vector with ηt ∼ i.i.d N (0,H). The error term vt is assumed to be i.i.d. N (0, σ
2). Γ is a matrix of
factor loadings, capturing the sensitivity of each variable to Ft. The parameter ρ governs the evolution of
the factor over time.
The model (1)-(2) is estimated using the EM algorithm outlined by Stock andWatson (2002) and Brave
and Butters (2012). The EM algorithm demands one pass through the Kalman filter3 and smoother, fol-
lowed by re-estimation of the model parameters by linear regression. This technique guarantees that the
resulting sequence of log-likelihood functions is non-decreasing.
2.2 What Is the Index Capturing?
My goal is to assess the health and resilience of the US financial system. The variables in Ωt must thus be
chosen accordingly. In effect, usual market-based indicators of risk, such as interest rates and risk premia,
are often low just before the peak of the financial cycle, when in retrospect, it transpires that risk was
at its highest (Borio and Zhu (2012)). This is the reason why my index focus on the balance sheets and
funding methods of the main US economic agents (households, non financial corporations and financial
corporations). A detailed description of the underlying data used for the construction of the indicator is
offered in the appendix.
Figure 1 plots the resulting risk sensitivity indicator, Ft. To establish a reference scale, the figure
expresses the index relative to its sample mean and standard deviation. A zero value is, thus, equivalent to
the sample mean, and deviations from zero are measured in standard deviation units. Positive (negative)
values indicate higher (lower) levels of risk-tolerance, credit supply and indebtedness than on average.
2The benefit of this methodology is its capacity to determine the importance of each variable, so that the weight each receives
is consistent with its historical importance to fluctuations in the health of the financial system.
3The Kalman filter is set up to cope with missing values as outlined by Durbin (2012).
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Figure 1: Risk Sensitivity Indicator
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Note: The shaded gray areas are recessions as defined by the NBER.
The series undergoes fairly large swings across time and is clearly procyclical. Known periods of eco-
nomic expansion correspond closely with increasingly positive index values. Note also that the turning
points of the index usually lead changes in economic conditions. This findings suggest that periods of
economic stability during which funding constraints are slack, profits are high, and net worth is accumulat-
ing are fertile grounds for the growth of financial fragility. By contrast, financial fragility declines during
economic recoveries as agents pay off their debts and save.4
3 Econometric Specification
3.1 The Theoretical Framework
I rely on a logistic vector smooth transition autoregressive (LVSTAR)model Terasvirta et al. (2010) in order
to capture the nonlinear relationships between the financial and real sides of the economy. The specification
is given by
Xt = A0 +
q∑
j=1
[Aj +G(dt)Bj ]Xt−j + ut, (3)
4This finding matches well with Minsky (1980), Adrian and Song Shin (2010) and Borio (2014), among others.
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whereXt is anm x 1 vector, A0 is anm x 1 intercept vector, Aj and Bj , j = 1, ..., q, arem xm parameter
matrices, ut is a vector of canonical innovations with zero mean, and covariance matrix given by Σu, and
G(dt) = diag [G1(dt), · · · , Gm(dt)] , (4)
is anm xm diagonal matrix of logistic transition functions
Gi(dt) = [1 + exp{−
γi
σd
(dt − d¯)}]
−1, (5)
for i = 1, ...,m. γi > 0, and d¯t is the long run average of the transition variable dt. By construction, the
transition function Gi(dt) is bounded between 0 and 1. When G(dt) = 0, the LVSTAR model becomes a
linear vector autoregressive model (VAR) with parameters Aj . In contrast, when G(dt) = 1, the LVSTAR
model becomes a different VAR with parameters Aj + Bj . The smoothness of the transition from one
extreme regime to the other is governed by the standardized parameter γ˜i = γi/σd. The model is estimated
by nonlinear least squares techniques.5
The vectorXt includes the detrended US real gross domestic product per capita
6, Yt, my risk sensitivity
indicator, Ft, and the shadow federal funds rate, Rt, of Wu and Xia (2016).
7 The data covers the period
1961Q1-2015Q3. Besides, the model includes two time lags of each variable.
I use the following usual strategy to identify monetary policy shocks. I denote εt the vector of struc-
tural shocks whose variance are normalized to unity and they are mutually uncorrelated. Let the mapping
between canonical innovations and structural shocks ut = Sεt where S is a 3 × 3 matrix. This matrix
is obtained as the Cholesky decomposition of Σu. As in Christiano et al. (1999), I choose to position
the variables in Xt in the following order [Yt, Ft, Rt]
′. Indeed, Christiano et al. (2005) argue that this
identifying assumption reflects a long-standing view that many macroeconomic variables do not respond
instantaneously to policy shocks. In addition, Ramey (2016) points out that results from Structural VARs
are quite robust when this recursiveness assumption on aggregate output is maintained but lead to short-
run depressive effects following an expansionary monetary policy when it is relaxed. When it comes to the
position of the financial variable, I check the robustness of our findings when allowing the risk sensitivity
indicator to respond in the same period (i.e when Xt = [Yt, Ft, Rt]
′). The key properties of the impulse
5Please refer to Terasvirta et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the estimation technique.
6The cyclical component of real GDP per capita is obtained by fitting a linear and quadratic time trends to the log of the original
series.
7The shadow rate is a summarymeasure of total accommodation provided by conventional and unconventionalmonetary policies.
When policy rates are positive, it is identical to the federal funds rate. When the zero lower bound is breached, it is the rate that
observed long-term interest rates would imply if the policy rate could be negative.
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Table 1: Evaluation Statistics
Transition Variable
MA(Yt) MA(Ft) MA(Rt)
Y Equation
Mean square error 0.465 0.489 0.451
Sum of squares residuals 97.18 102.1 94.17
Theil’s U-statistic 0.109 0.112 0.107
F Equation
Mean square error 0.114 0.117 0.116
Sum of squares residuals 23.85 24.37 24.31
Theil’s U-statistic 0.097 0.098 0.098
R Equation
Mean square error 0.726 0.739 0.749
Sum of squares residuals 151.7 154.5 156.5
Theil’s U-statistic 0.064 0.065 0.066
System as a Whole
Sum of squares residuals 272.7 281.0 275.0
Note: The variables MA(Yt), MA(Ft), and MA(Rt) denote, respectively, the
backward-looking four quarters moving average of ouput, the risk sensitivity and the
monetary policy rate.
responses are insensitive to this alternative identification scheme. More details on this will be given in
Appendix A.6.
3.2 Determining the Transition Variable
The transmission variable dt in (3)-(5) plays a key role in shaping the nonlinear dynamics of the model.
Unfortunately, economic theory does not provide much guidance on the subject. Thus, I restrict attention
to three candidates: the backward-looking 4 quarters moving averages of output, the risk sensitivity index
and the monetary policy rate. After estimation, I evaluate key statistics for each of these models, and select
the one that shows greater accuracy.
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Table 2: Linearity Tests
Standard Test Robust Test
Y equation 12.5* 11.4*
F equation 18.2** 12.0*
R equation 8.40 6.94
All equations 42.8*** -
Note: The standard linearity test is based onWeise (1999). The robust version is based
on Wooldridge (1990). Linearity is rejected if the test statistics is greater the critical
value of the chi-square distribution for some desired false-rejection probability.
Table 1 displays the results. The moving average of output performs better in the Ft and Rt equations.
In contrast, the moving average of the interest rate is preferred in the output equation. Finally, the sum of
squares residuals of the whole system tilts the balance in favor of the moving average of Yt. Therefore, in
what follows, dt is assumed to be the backward-looking 4 quarters moving average of Yt
3.3 Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Linearity
Before assessing the (more complicated) nonlinear model, it is essential to test linearity. The basic logic is
that if the true data generating process is linear and the nonlinear specification nests such a linear model,
then the parameters of the nonlinear model cannot be estimated consistently [Terasvirta et al. (2010)].
To this end, I use of the Lagrange multiplier test presented in Weise (1999). A test of linearity is a
test of the null hypothesis H0 : γi = 0 against H1 : γi 6= 0 in (5). The test is a three step procedure
based on a Taylor expansion of the transition function around the point γi = 0. The test can be performed
equation by equation and for the system as a whole. Please refer to appendix 2 for more details on this.
Furthermore, given that the standard test statistic is invalid in the presence of conditional or unconditional
heteroskedasticity, I also consider the robust version presented in Wooldridge (1990).
Table 2 reports the results. Overall, the tests provide strong evidence against linearity and favor the
use of our LVSTAR specification. To be more precise, linearity is rejected in the GDP and FCI equations.
Besides, it is rejected for the system as a whole.
3.4 Evaluation of the Model
This subsection checks the stability of the model and conducts various misspecification tests.
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Figure 2: Stability of the System
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Note: Top panel: output equation. Middle panel: risk sensitivity index equation. Bottom
panel: shadow rate equation. All paths converge to the same stable point; thus confirming
the stability of the model.
Stability of the System
Stability is assessed numerically, by producing sequences of realizations from the model by turning off
the noise, starting from a large number of initial conditions. Convergence to a single point is required
for stability [Tera¨svirta and Yang (2014)]. Figure 2 shows the results. All histories in the data set are
considered as initial values. The paths always converge to the same stationary point; thereby confirming
the stability of the model.
Misspecification tests
Table 3 shows some misspecification tests for measuring the quality of the model. The first row presents
the Lilliefors test for normality. It shows the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the residuals are nor-
mally distributed. Normality cannot be rejected in the Y and F equations. It can, however, be rejected
in the R equation; which suggests the presence of some outliers. The second row of Table 3 displays the
Ljung-Box Q-test. This is a ”portmanteau” test that assesses the null hypothesis that the residuals exhibit
no autocorrelation of order one. The results of the test do not suggest model misspecification. That is,
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected in any equation. The third row presents the
regression specification error test (RESET). A significant test statistic suggests some sort of model mis-
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Table 3: Evaluating the Solution
Equation
Y F R
Lilliefors test 0.05 0.04 0.13***
Ljung-Box Q-test 0.02 1.63 0.87
RESET test 0.04 2.52 3.61*
Parameter constancy test 2.30 0.18 0.29
Note: This table measures the quality of the model. The variables Y , F andR, denote,
respectively, output, the risk sensitivity indicator, and the monetary policy rate.
specification, such as omitted variables or incorrect functional form [Ramsey (1969)]. The test never finds
any evidence of misspecification in the Y and F equations. In the R equation, misspecification is rejected
at the 5% significance level, but not at the 10% level. The fourth row checks parameter constancy.8 A
statistically significant test statistic indicates that the parameters of the model change smoothly over time.
However in all equations, the test statistic is lower than the critical value at the 1% significant level. Thus,
the hypothesis that the parameters are constant over time cannot be rejected.9
Taken together, these findings suggest that the modeling exercise has been quite successful.
4 Dynamic Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks
The main contribution of this paper is to assess the importance of the risk taking channel following a
monetary policy shock. The procedure I use to isolate this channel in the transmission of monetary policy
shocks is built on Bachmann and Sims (2012). In my setup, risk taking can operate as an amplifying
mechanism for monetary policy shocks. In effect, if the systemic risk index reacts to monetary policy at
any horizon, and if the coefficients of lagged systemic risk are significant in the output equation, then the
dynamic response of systemic risk will influence the dynamic response of output to a monetary policy
shock. My aim is to statistically isolate the direct effect of monetary policy shocks on output from the
indirect effect operating through the risk taking behavior of economic agents. To this end, I construct
hypothetical impulse responses to a policy shock keeping systemic risk fixed at all forecast horizons. A
8Please refer to Appendix 4 for more details on this.
9I also test the model against the alternative of a single structural break by using the Chow test. The model always passes it.
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comparison of these hypothetical responses with the actual ones assesses the importance of risk taking as
a transmission mechanism of policy shocks.10
In nonlinear models, impulse responses are sensitive to initial conditions. Consequently, I compute
the the nonlinear impulse responses for three different cases: (i) a “normal” regime, in which the initial
conditions of output are associated with the [40%− 60%] percentiles of its empirical distribution, (ii) an
“expansion” regime, in which the initial conditions of output are selected from the top 20% percentiles,
and (iii) a “recession” regime, in which the initial conditions of output are selected from the bottom 20%
percentiles.
Figure 3 displays the generalized impulse response functions of the model to a monetary policy shock,
associated with the three above cases.11 Solid lines represent the impulse responses to a one-standard
deviation expansionary monetary policy shock in the LVSTAR model. Dotted lines show the hypothetical
impulse responses holding the response of risk sensitivity fixed at zero. Dashed lines describe the results
for the corresponding linear VAR model.
Two major findings emerge. First, in normal times the nonlinear impulse responses are very similar
to those estimated in the linear model. However, this is no true in extreme states, particularly during
expansions. The solid lines show that, while in recession output declines on impact before rising slightly a
few quarters later, in an economic expansion it rises significantly and remains persistently well above zero.
As for risk sensitivity, the impact of the shock is much stronger in the expansion regime.
Second, the behavior of output without the endogenous response of risk taking is lower than in the
standard model across all regimes. This suggests a positive role of risk taking in the transmission of mon-
etary policy. However, the impulse responses are strongly state-dependent. In the expansionary regime the
difference between the hypothetical and actual output response is large. In contrast, in the low and normal
growth regimes the difference is economically small and statistically insignificant. This corroborates the
notion that the risk-taking channel is far from being the most important transmission channel of monetary
policy. However, during booms when risk is underestimated, the buildup of risks can amplify significantly
business fluctuations and increase macroeconomic volatility Borio and Zhu (2012).
To quantify these findings, Table 4 presents two measures of the effect of monetary policy shocks on
output : (i) the maximum response of output over a 20 quarter horizon, called max effect, and (ii) the sum
over the same time horizon of the output response, called cumulative effect. As expected, the effect of the
shock in a normal regime is very similar to that estimated in the linear model. By contrast, in expansion
the effect is much larger. In particular, both the max and cumulative effects are almost three times as large
10See Appendix 5 for a formal exposition of the procedure.
11The generalized impulse response functions are computed according to Koop et al. (1996).
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Figure 3: Dynamic Effects of an Expansionary Policy Shock
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Note: Solid lines: benchmark model. Dotted lines: no risk taking channel. Dashed lines:
linear VAR model. Gray shaded areas are the 90% confidence intervals of the benchmark
model.
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Table 4: The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Output
Lin. Mod. Normal Times Expansion Recession
Benchmark Specification
Max effect 0.41 0.50 1.18 0.33
Cumulative effect 5.75 6.14 15.6 3.79
Isolating risk sensitivity
Max effect - 0.22 0.36 0.23
Cumulative effect - 3.13 5.36 2.66
Note: This table shows the effects of expansionary monetary policy shocks on output. The max effect is defined as
the maximum response of output over a 20 quarter horizon. The cumulative effect is defined as the sum over the same
time horizon of the output response.
than in the linear specification. In recession, these effects are substantially smaller. The bottom panel of
Table 1 summarizes the response of output when risk sensitivity is held fixed at zero. Both the max and
cumulative responses of output are larger in the expansion regime. Nonetheless, the differences across
regimes are much smaller than in the benchmark specification. This highlights, once again, the importance
of a risk-taking behavior during economic booms.
The Historical Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
The LVSTAR specification allows the effects of monetary policy to vary continuously with the state of the
economy. To see this point more clearly, Figure 4 presents estimates for the historical effects of monetary
policy shocks on output. For each period, I consider a one standard deviation negative (i.e. expansionary)
policy shock, and report the cumulative response of output over a 20 quarter horizon. The figure plots the
cumulative response in the solid line, with the hypothetical response where risk sensitivity is held constant
as the dashed line.
Some notable features stand out. First of all, the cumulative response of output varies considerably over
the business cycle. In particular, it tends to be elevated before NBER recessions. For instance, in 2007 it
was around six times larger than in 2010. The correlation between the standard cumulative response and
detrended GDP is significantly positive at 0.88. In the hypothetical case in which risk sensitivity is held
fixed, in contrast, the response of output is much more stable; ranging from 2 to 6. Lastly, it is worth noting
that the cumulative response was higher during the economic boom preceding the 2008 crisis. Unarguably,
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Figure 4: The Cumulative Response of Output over Time
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Note: Solid lines: benchmark model. Dotted lines: no risk taking channel. Shaded gray
areas are recessions as defined by the NBER.
a period of rapid growth, coupled with lax lending standards, over-borrowing and excessive risk taking.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I provide evidence that the role of the risk-taking channel depends on the state of the economy.
During economic booms, the risk-taking channel of monetary policy has an amplifying effect on output.
It is therefore important for central banks to take this channel into account when adjusting their policy in
order not to exacerbate boom-bust patterns and accommodate the buildup of financial imbalances.
Of course, my study, like all time series models, have limitations when it comes to structural inference
and policy analysis. These weakness ought to encourage future theoretical work to develop non linear
dynamic general equilibrium models to better understand the interrelationships among monetary policy,
systemic risk and economic activity.
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Appendix
A.1 Information Underlying the Risk Sensitivity Indicator
Table 5: Description of Financial Variables by Economic Sector
Financial Indicator Source Period
Households
Debt service payments to disposable personal income BIS 1980Q1-2015Q3
Net worth FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Total liabilities FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Nonfinancial Corporate Business
Net worth FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Total liabilities FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Short Term Liabilities to Total Liabilities FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Interest Service Ratio FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Financial Business
Total Equity Capital FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Total liabilities FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Short Term Liabilities to Total Liabilities FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Total Financial Assets of Shadow Banks FA 1961Q1-2015Q3
Additional Financial Indicators
Total Credit to Private Non-Financial Sectors BIS 1961Q1-2015Q3
Residential Property Prices BIS 1975Q4-2015Q3
Note: I use the quarterly annual growth rate of each variable. BIS stands for Bank for International Settlements. FA denotes the
Financial Accounts of the US. All variables are in real terms. Interest Service Ratio is equal to the net operating surplus plus interest
received, divided by interest paid. These three variables are only available at annual frequency. I use cubic spline interpolation to
disaggregate annual data to quarterly series. Shadow banks aggregates ABS issuers, finance companies and funding corporations.
A.2 Estimation Procedure
This subsection describes the numerical technique used to estimate my LVSTAR model. The model con-
tains the parameters Ξ = {A0, Aj , Bj , γi} for j = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2, 3. The nonlinear least squares
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estimator of Ξ is obtained by solving the optimization problem:
ΞˆNLS = argmin
Ξ
T∑
t=1
u′tut
Akey to simplifying the optimization exercise is to note that when γi is known, the solution for {A0, Aj , Bj}
is analytic. For this reason, I use a grid search over γi. Specifically, I proceed as follows:
1. I first construct an evenly spaced grid with 3000 nodes for γi.
2. Then I estimate {A0, Aj , Bj} by ordinary least squares conditionally on each value of γi in the grid.
3. Lastly, I select the set {Aˆ0, Aˆj , Bˆj , γˆj} that produces the smallest residuals sum of squares.
Of particular interest is the fact that this numerical optimization method does not require specific assump-
tions about the first and second partial derivatives of the objective function with respect to Ξ.
A.3 Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Linearity
Consider the model (3)-(5). A test of linearity is a test of the null hypothesis H0 : γi = 0 against H1 :
γi > 0. Linearity can be tested equation by equation and in the system as a whole [Weise (1999)]. To test
linearity equation by equation, I proceed as follows:
1. I first estimate the model under H0. That is, I run the regression:
Xm,t =
q∑
j=0
βjXt−j + εt.
I then collect the residuals εˆt and compute the residuals sum of squares, SSR0.
2. Next, I run the auxiliary regression:
εˆt =
q∑
j=0
αjXt−j +
q∑
j=1
δjdtXt−j + υt,
compute the residuals υˆt and the residuals sum of squares SSR1.
3. Finally, I calculate the test statistic:
LM = T
SSR0 − SSR1
SSR0
,
where T is the number of observations. Under the null, LM is distributed χ2(qm).
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To test linearity in the system as a whole, I use the log-likelihood test outlined in Weise (1999). The null
hypothesis is H0 : γi = 0 in all equations. I define Γ0 =
ǫˆtǫˆ
′
t
T
and Γ1 =
υˆtυˆ
′
t
T
, where ǫˆ and υˆ are the
residuals computed above. Then the statistic LR = T [log | Γ0 | −log | Γ1 |] is asymptotically distributed
χ2(qm2).
A.4 Parameter Constancy Test
To test parameter constancy equation by equation, I proceed as follows [see Terasvirta et al. (2010)]:
1. I estimate the benchmark model:
Xm,t = Am,0 +
2∑
j=1
[Am,j +G(dt)Bm,j ]Xt−j + um,t,
and compute the residuals sum of squares, SSR0.
2. I estimate the auxiliary model:
Xm,t = δ0 +
2∑
j=1
[δj +G(dt)βj ]Xt−j + α0sin(2kπτ
∗) + α1cos(2kπτ
∗) + εt.
Here k = 0.5T − 1 is the frequency parameter and T is the number of observations. The variable
τ∗ = t
T
with t = 1, ..., T is the time trend. I compute the residuals sum of squares, SSR1.
3. I compute the F test statistic:
F =
SSR0−SSR1
2
SSR1
T−15
The null hypothesis,H0 : α0 = α1 = 0, cannot be rejected if the F statistic is lower than the critical value
of the F-distribution for some desired false-refection probability.
A.5 Isolating the Risk Taking Channel
For ease of exposition, I present the procedure in a linear VAR(1) model.12 The method is conceptually
identical in more complicated models. Consider the structural form:
Ψ0Xt = Ψ1Xt−1 + ǫt, (6)
12See Bachmann and Sims (2012) for a more complete exposition.
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where, Xt = [Yt Ft Rt]
′, Ψ0 is an lower triangular parameter matrix, Ψ1 is a 3 × 3 parameter matrix,
E(ǫt) = 0 and
E(ǫtǫ
′
t) =


σ2Y 0 0
0 σ2F 0
0 0 σ2R

 .
Suppose that the system has been in steady state for a while. Then a policy shock hits the economy at time
0:
ǫ0 =


0
0
σR

 and X0 = Ψ−10 ǫ0.
The effect of the shock on variable i = [Y, F,R] at horizon h = 1, · · · , H is:
Φi,h = Ψ
−1
0
Ψ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
Φh−1, (7)
The though experiment of holding risk taking constant in response to a change in monetary policy demands
setting ΦF,h = 0 at each forecast horizon. This is done by creating a hypothetical sequence of systemic
risk shocks, ǫ˜F,t, so as to force this to hold at each relevant horizon. Formally, ǫ˜F,t is given by:
ΦF,h = 0 ⇐⇒ ǫ˜F,t = −c2,1ΦY,h−1 − c2,2ΦF,h−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
−c2,3ΦR,h−1, (8)
Given this sequence, the hypothetical impulse responses to the policy shock, Φˆi,h, are:
Φˆi,h = CΦˆi−1,h +Ψ
−1
0


0
u˜F,t
0

 . (9)
Comparing these hypothetical responses, Φˆi,h, with the actual responses, Φi,h provides a measure of
how important the response of systemic risk is in transmission of the monetary policy shocks.
A.6 Robustness Check
This section checks the robustness of my strategy to identify monetary policy shocks. To this end, I allow
the risk sensitivity indicator to instantaneously respond to policy shocks. That is, I impose the following
order of variables Xt = [Yt, Ft, Rt]
′. Figure 5 plots the generalized impulse response of the model to a
monetary policy shock. It is apparent that the key properties of the impulse responses are insensitive to
this alternative identification scheme.
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Figure 5: Dynamic Effects of an Expansionary Policy Shock
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(b) Expansion
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(c) Recession
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Note: Solid lines: benchmark model. Dotted lines: no risk taking channel. Dashed lines:
linear VAR model. Gray shaded areas are the 90% confidence intervals of the benchmark
model.
90
